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NOTE
WHO GETS A DEAD MAN'S GOLD? THE DILEMMA OF
LOTTERY WINNINGS PAYABLE TO A DECEDENTS
ESTATE
Act I.
' Your dad called today. He finally found that lottery ticket he
misplaced."
"That's great. At least we won't have to worry anymore about
being bankrupted by nursing home bills."
Act II.
"Hon, it's the hospital. We'd better get there fast. Your dad's
taken a turn for the worse."
Act III.
"Ion, it's that IRS man again. If we don't come up with the
money within thirty days, they're going to start foreclosure on
the house and attach our savings account."
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A. Scope of Analysis
This article addresses the federal estate tax and federal in-
come tax consequences of lottery winnings which flow to the
estate of a decedent or, alternatively, directly to the decedent's
beneficiaries. State income tax and state death tax consider-
ations must also be taken into account. With respect to these
secondary implications, this article draws largely upon the Code
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of Virginia and the relevant sections of Virginia's income tax
and estate tax statutes. Some references will be made to the
possibility of contrary statutory treatment in other states, but
primary reliance will be upon Virginia law.
B. The Problem As Defined by NAASPL
Under present IRS policy, the abbreviated scenario depicted
above is a dramatized reminder of the potential pitfalls await-
ing the euphoric but unwary family members of a lottery win-
ner.
The current policy is to treat lottery winnings payable to the
estate of a decedent over a number of years as an annuity, and
to assess estate taxes based on the commuted value of the
future payouts.' The potential liability of individual beneficia-
ries is illustrated by the following example proffered by the
North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries
(NAASPL).2
Assume that an unmarried taxpayer purchases a one dollar
lottery ticket that wins a $20 million jackpot, payable in annual
installments of one million dollars over twenty years.3 Assume
further that the taxpayer's luck ran out and he died due to an
accident after receiving the first payment. The heirs grieve, but
are comforted by the knowledge that they are now wealthy. At
probate, they accept the assets of the estate, which are negligi-
ble except for the lottery winnings. Their first unpleasant sur-
prise is a notice from the IRS that the present value of the
future revenue stream of $19 million in lottery winnings is $9.5
1. See generally Letter from Paul F. Kugler, Assistant Chief Counsel
(Passthroughs and Special Industries), Internal Revenue Service, to William S. Berg-
man, Executive Director, North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries
(May 6, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kugler]; Letter from Kenneth W.
Thorson, Director, Virginia Lottery, to Fred Goldberg, Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy, U.S. Treasury Department (March 11, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Thorson]; Analysis of IRS Tax Position on Estates of Decedents Who Are Lotto Jackpot
Prize Winners Whose Prizes Are Paid Over Time, (N. Am. Ass'n of State and Provin-
cial Lotteries) (undated) (on file with author) [hereinafter NAASPL Analysis].
2. See NAASPL Analysis, supra note 1, at 3-5.
3. See Virginia State Lottery Dept. Reg. VR 447-02-2, § 3.33 (1992); Virginia
Lottery Director's Order 32(90), 14 (October 31, 1990).
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million and the estate tax on this amount is approximately
$5.225 million.4
This initial tax liability is only the beginning of the newly
"wealthy" heirs' troubles. Unless they possess other assets with
which to pay the taxes owed, they will be delinquent nine
months after the taxpayer's death.' The first installment of one
million dollars from the lottery will be available to the heirs,
but will fall far short of the $5,225,000 due.
Once the estate is delinquent, the IRS assesses a monthly
penalty of one-half of one percent per month, up to a maximum
penalty of twenty-five percent.' In dollar terms, the monthly
penalty of $26,125 could aggregate to a maximum of
$1,306,250.
7
In addition to the tax liability and the monthly-accruing
penalty, the IRS assesses interest on both of these amounts' at
the federal short-term rate plus three percentage points Be-
4. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1984) (as modified by I.R.S. Notice 89-60, 1989-1
C.B. 700). This regulation, as modified, specifies that the commuted value of annu-
ities and similar interests shall be computed based on an interest rate equal to 120%
of the applicable federal midterm rate for the month of valuation. For the month of
June 1993, this rate, based on annual compounding, was 6.41%. Rev. Rul. 93-39,
1993-22 I.R.B. 5 (Table 1). Under the provisions of I.R.C. § 7520(a)(2) (1992), this
figure is to be rounded to the nearest two-tenths of one percent, or 6.4%. In comput-
ing their example, NAASPL used interest rates in effect in 1992 and an estate tax
rate of 55%. I.R.C. § 2001(c)(2)(D) (1992). NAASPL also disregarded as insubstantial
the effect of any credits, exclusions, exemptions or deductions. Since these computa-
tions were derived, interest rates have declined and the maximum federal estate tax
rate dropped to 50% (disregarding the effective marginal rate increase for estates over
$10 million due to the phaseout of the $600,000 unified credit equivalent for estates
exceeding that level). The 1993 tax package restored the previous maximum rate of
55%, for estates exceeding $3 million. Special Supplement: A Tax Bill Baedeker-A
Guide to the 1993 Tax Law, 60 TAx NoTEs 809, 828 (1993) (citing Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,208), 107 Stat. 312, 469 (1993)
[hereinafter Baedeker].
5. See I.R.C. § 6075(a) (1993). Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6161(a) (1993), the Secretary
of the Treasury may extend the time for payment for up to 12 months. Additionally,
IRS District Directors have discretionary authority to extend the time for payment by
"entering into an installment agreement with the estate." Kugler, supra note 1, at 1.
6. See I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2) (1993).
7. See NAASPL Analysis, supra note 1, at 4.
8. See I.R.C. § 6601(a), (e)(2)(A) (1993).
9. See I.R.C. § 6621(a)(2) (1993). Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6621(b)(3) (1993), the fed-
eral short-term rate for any given month shall be rounded to the nearest full percent,
or, if a multiple of one-half of 1%, to the next highest full percent. Using the short-
term rates in Table 1 of Rev. Rul. 93-39, 1993-22 I.R.B. 5, the rate for June 1993
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cause of the additional penalty each month that the tax is de-
linquent and the compounding of the interest on the tax and
cumulative penalties, the monthly increase in the amount owed
the IRS grows each month. If no payments are made, the liabil-
ity will increase by more than $900,000o by the end of the
first year. By the fiftieth month (when penalties are capped at
twenty-five percent), the monthly rate of increase in the
amount owed is $85,755, or $1,029,060 annually. 1 At that
point, with no additional penalties being imposed, the monthly
increase in the tax bill is "only" $59,869, or $718,437 per
year. 2 "At all times, the amount of annual increase for penalty
and interest exceeds the after-tax income from the annual,
future jackpot payments.""3
C. A Second Look at the Problem
The NAASPL example arguably overstates the magnitude of
the problem. There are four adjustments to the NAASPL exam-
ple which, although not universally applicable, would serve to
ameliorate the liability for most estates. A fifth possible adjust-
ment, based on lower interest rates'4 in 1993, will not be dis-
cussed, due to the probability that 1993 rates were atypically
low and would likely rise in the long term. The other four ad-
justments are: (1) discounting the future stream of payouts,
both for present value and illiquidity, (2) inclusion of the
$600,000 estate/gift tax exemption, (3) the likelihood of penalty
waivers and (4) application in full of the $1 million annual
payouts to liquidation of the estate's tax liability.
would be 4% plus the 3% add-on for a total interest rate of 7%. Pursuant to I.R.C. §
6622 (1993), interest is compounded daily. Again, the NAASPL computations were
based on interest rates in effect in 1992.
10. See NAASPL Analysis, supra note 1, at 4.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added).
14. Lower interest rates work in the opposite direction, creating a higher present
value and a correspondingly higher tax liability. For example, the annuity factor
applicable in September 1992, based on an interest rate of 7.2%, was 10.1824 for a
nineteen year annuity. By June 1993, the interest rate had dropped to 6.4%. See Rev.
Rul. 93-39, supra note 4. The annuity factor was 10.8174. Actuarial Values, Alpha
Volume, I.R.S. Pub. No. 1457 (8-89), at 3-11, 3-13.
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Discounting 'property in an estate due to its illiquidity or
restrictions on its transfer is well-accepted in estate and gift
tax law. The section of the Virginia State Lottery Law dealing
with the right of assignment, rewritten in 1992, provides that
"[n]o right of any person to a prize drawn shall be assign-
able .... "' The statute goes on to list three exceptions:
transfer to a designated beneficiary at the winner's death,
transfer to the deceased winner's estate absent a designated
beneficiary, and transfer to another pursuant to a court or-
der. 6 These exceptions are exclusive-no other transfers are
permitted, thereby prohibiting post-mortem transfers by desig-
nated beneficiaries or heirs of the estate. If the rights to the
future payouts were freely transferable, the market would es-
tablish a value, presumably the discounted or present value of
the future income. The fact that these rights are, by statute,
not transferable, does not mean that they have no value. Their
value in the hands of the holder is, by analogy to well-estab-
lished law applicable to property such as large blocks of securi-
ties or closely held corporations, discounted due to the impedi-
ments to their transfer.
If the- estate contains an unusually large block of stock, such
that its liquidation could not be accomplished within a reason-
able time without depressing the market price, valuation for
estate tax purposes will be made by alternative methods, such
as the price commanded by sale through an underwriter. 7 The
valuation of shares in closely held corporations held by an es-
tate is accorded special treatment. Where most or all of the
shares of a corporation are held within a family, there is effec-
tively no market from which to derive a price. In such a situa-
tion, the Service has indicated a willingness to examine a num-
ber of factors in order to reach a surrogate for the fair market
value. 8 Valuation of such properties in an estate is more art
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-4013(A) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
16. Id.
17. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (1992). See also Rev. Rul. 83-30, 1983-1 C.B.
224 ("blockage discount" considered when valuing large block of stock sold through an
underwriter).
18. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, modified by, Rev. Rul. 65-193, 1965-2
C.B. 370 and amplified by, Rev. Rul. 77-287, 1977-2 C.B. 319 (1977), Rev. Rul. 80-
213, 1980-2 C.B. 101, Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170 (listing eight factors to be
considered). See also Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938, 951-57 (1982)
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than science and will normally depend on the facts of each
case. Valuation of properties having no ready market is "inher-
ently imprecise and capable of resolution only by a Solomon-like
pronouncement." 9 Because of the fact-specific nature of the
problem, "each case necessarily turns on its own particular
facts."20 To the best of this writer's knowledge, the question of
the present valuation of a revenue stream of lottery payouts
payable over time would be one of first impression. The present
value is clearly greater than zero, but since the rights to the
income stream are not alienable, it could hardly be argued that
the value is that derived from government annuity tables. It
would appear that resolution of this question rests with the
"Solomon-like" wisdom of the courts.
The second adjustment, the $600,000 exemption, or the
$192,800 unified credit, is fully available only if it has not been
previously used as a shelter against gift taxes or is not current-
ly needed as a shelter against taxes imposed on other assets in
the decedent's gross estate. Thus, some estates will not be able
to use the exemption to shelter lottery winnings. Some estates
will be able to use the exemption, but not to its full extent,
while others will be able to exploit it fully to shield part of the
lottery winnings. For the purpose of analysis, we will assume
full use of the exemption.
The third adjustment concerns the likelihood that, upon prop-
er application to the Service, penalties will be waived. Upon a
showing of reasonable cause, the IRS may grant an extension of
the time allowed for payment of up to twelve months. Further
extensions may be granted for periods up to ten years from the
original due date in cases of "undue hardship."2'
(discount from Commissioner's valuation due to lack of marketability expressed in
dollars but equating to 42.6%); Estate of Piper v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1062, 1084-
86 (1979) (35% discount allowed on valuation of stock due to private placement neces-
sitated by lack of marketability).
19. Messing v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967), acq. 1968-2 C.B. 2 (valua-
tion dispute in gifts of shares in a closely held corporation).
20. Id.
21. I.R.C. § 6161(a)(2) (1993). "Reasonable cause" justifying an extension is dem-
onstrated when:
[a]n estate is comprised [sic] in substantial part of assets consisting of
rights to receive payments in the future (i.e. annuities, copyright royal-
ties, contingent fees, or accounts receivable). These assets provide insuffi-
cient present cash with which to pay the estate tax when otherwise due
[Vol. 28:443448
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The final adjustment is the full application of each year's $1
million payout to liquidation of the tax liability. If the initial
payout were largely or fully intact, the tax liability could be
immediately reduced by as much as $1 million. 2 By applying
these four adjustments to the NAASPL example of $19 million
in future payouts, the drastic effects described in part I(B) can
be significantly ameliorated.
D. A Twenty Year Analysis
In the fall of 1992, NAASPL more closely examined the ex-
ample described in part I(B). In a portion of that analysis,
three of the four adjustments outlined in part I(C) were incor-
porated. The adjustment based on discounting for inalienability
and illiquidity was not employed. The relevant results of that
in-depth examination are reproduced here as Tables 1 and 2 .'
and the estate cannot borrow against these assets except upon terms
which would inflict loss upon the estate.
Trees. Reg. § 20.6161-1(a)(1) (1992) (example (2)).
22. The Lottery Department would, of course, withhold income taxes on the $1
million payout, but since this example assumes that the entire amount will be used
to pay taxes, the effect is of no consequence. The estate will be liable for both estate
and income taxes; the amount paid as estate tax can be deducted against the estate's
income tax. These relationships will be explored more fully in part I, sections (D) and
(F). See infra text accompanying notes 23-42, 50-65.
23. See generally The Death of a Lottery Recipient: Problems and Suggested Solu-
tions, Memorandum from Marvin Winick & Douglas E. Gross, of Brown, Winick,
Graves, Donnelly, Baskerville and Schoenebaum, Des Moines, Iowa to NAASPL (Oct.1, 1992) [hereinafter Winick memo] (on file with author).
1994] 449
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Table 1
ASSUMPTIONS
Annual Death Tax Payments = 10% of Total Adjusted Death Taxes.
Interest rate on unpaid death taxes remains constant at 8%
Death tax computation is amended annually to reflect interest deductions.
Marginal death tax rate remains constant at 55%
State/Provincial death tax equals the federal tax credit for state death taxes.
State/Provincial death tax can be paid on the same terms as federal estate tax.
DEATH TAX CALCULATION
1992 Lottery Proceeds (after income taxes)
Present Value of Remaining 19 Lottery Payments
Interest Deduction
Taxable Estate
Tentative Tax
Unified Credit
State Death Tax Credit
Federal Estate Tax
State Death Tax
Total Death Taxes
DEATH TAX PAYMENT SCHEDULE
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Totals
Total
Adjusted
Death Taxes
0
5,505,555
5,287,535
5,102,373
4,947,809
4,821,816
4,722,582
4,648,494
4,598,120
4,570,193
4,563,605
Annual
Death Tax
Payments
0
550,556
528,754
510,237
494,781
482,182
472,258
464,849
459,812
457,019
143,157
Initial Final
Calculation Calculation
650,000 650,000
10,363,737 10,363,737
0 -1,712,638
11,013,737 9,301,099
5,698,355 4,756,405
-192,800 -192,800
-1,228,998 -961,367
4,276,557 3,602,238
1,228,998 961,367
5,505,555 4,563,605
Cumulative
Total Death Tax
Interest Payments Payments
0
0
396,400
336,658
281,026
229,079
180,425
134,705
91,590
50,775
11,980
4,563,605 1,712,638
0
550,556
925,154
846,895
775,807
711,260
652,683
599,555
551,402
507,795
155,136
6,276,242
550,556
1,079,309
1,589,546
2,084,327
2,566,509
3,038,767
3,503,617
3,963,429
4,420,443
4,563,605
Unpaid
Balance of
Death Taxes
4,955,000
4,208,226
3,512,827
2,863,482
2,255,307
1,683,815
1,144,878
634,691
149,746
0
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Table 2
ASSUMPTIONS
Combined federal and state/provincial income tax rate remains constant at
Estate tax deduction for income tax purposes (total federal tax / 19) =
After-tax rate of return on invested net lottery proceeds =
NET PROCEEDS AVAILABLE TO LOTTERY WINNER
Annual
Death Tax
Payments
0
550,556
528,754
510,237
494,781
482,182
472,258
464,849
459,812
457,019
143,157
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Net
Lottery
Interest Proceeds
0
0
396,400
336,658
281,026
229,079
180,425
134,705
91,590
50,775
11,980
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Totals
The tables depict the tax consequences of winning a $20
million dollar jackpot on July 1, 1992, collecting the initial $1
million dollar installment on that same date, and then dying on
September 30, 1992. The tables also reflect a request by the
estate's executor for a ten-year extension of the time in which
to pay the tax pursuant to I.R.C. § 6161(a). Table 1 focuses on
satisfaction of the estate tax liability over the ten year period
1993-2002, showing the effect of interest paid on the outstand-
ing balances and the deduction of that interest as an expense of
19941 451
35%
189,591
Gross
Lottery
Proceeds
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,00
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
20,000,000 5,739,217 4,563,605 1,712,638 7,984,541
Annual
Income Tax
Payments
350,000
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
283,643
650,000
165,801
-208,797
-130,538
-59,450
5,097
63,674
116,802
164,955
208,562
561,221
716,357
716,357
716,357
716,357
716,357
716,357
716,357
716,357
716,357
Future
Value of
Net Proceeds
1,966,640
473,254
-562,242
-331,614
-142,476
11,524
135,813
235,029
313,133
373,503
948,170
1,141,764
1,077,136
1,016,166
958,647
904,384
853,193
804,899
759,338
716,357
11,652,620
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administering the estate. Table 2 addresses the income tax
liability of the estate over the entire twenty year payout period,
and shows the effect of deducting the estate taxes paid during
the years 1993-2002 against the income tax liability for those
years. A more detailed discussion follows.
The assumptions made are shown at the top of each table. In
Table 1 the present value of annual lottery payouts of one mil-
lion dollars for nineteen years is $10,363,737.' Estate taxes
are paid over ten years pursuant to I.R.C. § 6161(a). It should
be noted that the statutory language is discretionary. "The Sec-
retary may, for reasonable cause, extend the time for
payment . . ."2' The estate tax liability is recomputed each
year during the ten year period to reflect the deduction for
interest actually paid.26 For example, the interest actually paid
in 1994 would be a deduction against that year's taxes. At a
55% rate, the $396,400 in interest payments would yield a tax
savings of $218,020 against the $5,505,555 tax otherwise due,
resulting in a restated tax for the year of $5,287,535.
The interest rate on the unpaid tax balances is assumed to
be a constant eight percent.2 7 In fact, the interest rate is sub-
ject to quarterly variations28 and must be recomputed each
time an annual interest payment is made. The federal estate
tax rate is assumed to remain constant at 55%. The maximum
federal estate tax rate declined to 50% in 1993, but reverted to
its former level with the 1993 tax bill.29
24. The relevant interest rate (120% of the applicable federal mid-term rate) for
September 1992 was 7.19%. Id. at 8. This figure is rounded off to the nearest two-
tenths of one percent (or 7.2%) and is used in the annuity tables in I.R.S. Publication
1457. At an interest rate of 7.2%, the annuity factor for 19 years is 10.1824, which
for a $1 million annuity would yield a valuation of $10,182,400. The factor for 20
years is 10.4313, which would yield a valuation of $10,431,300. The valuation actually
used by Winick and Gross, $10,363,737, is approximately three-fourths of the differ-
ence between the lower (19 year) valuation derived from the annuity table and the
higher (20 year) valuation.
25. I.R.C. § 6161(a) (1993) (emphasis added).
26. See Rev. Rul. 81-256, 1981-2 C.B. 183 (interest expense incurred is deductible
under I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2)).
27. The interest rate for June 1993 was seven percent. The September 1992 rate
was also seven percent. See supra note 9. See Winick memo, supra note 23, at 9.
28. See I.R.C. § 6621(b)(2)(A) (1993).
29. See supra note 4.
452 [Vol. 28:443
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The remaining assumptions for Table 1 deal with state death
taxes, the credit they receive against the federal estate tax, and
the payment terms associated with them. The starting point for
this discussion is the federal estate tax code. The Code provides
that estate or similar taxes actually paid to a state government
shall, within limitations, be credited against federal estate tax-
es otherwise payable. The credit schedule ranges from eight-
tenths of one percent for small estates to sixteen percent for
estates exceeding $10,040,000. 30 If a state's death tax does not
exceed the percentage amounts in the federal credit schedule,
the entire amount of the state tax actually paid will be credited
against the federal estate tax. The death tax laws vary from
state to state. The language of the Virginia Estate Tax Act is
keyed to the federal Code. For estates of Virginia residents, the
Virginia estate tax is imposed "in the amount of the federal
credit . . . "3' For -estates of nonresidents, the Virginia estate
tax is expressed as a fraction of the federal credit, imposing the
Virginia tax on that percentage of the estate subject to the
jurisdiction of the Virginia Estate Tax Act.32 Since neither sec-
tion of the Virginia statute imposes an estate tax exceeding the
federal credit, the Virginia tax is fully offset by a corresponding
credit to the federal estate tax. In Table 1, the state death tax
is shown as a positive number, while the (federal) state death
tax credit is shown as an offsetting negative figure. In the
initial calculation, the state death tax rate comes to 11.16%,
while in the final calculation, the rate is 10.34%. This variation
reflects the graduated brackets in the federal credit schedule,
with the larger taxable estate in the initial calculation being
subject to higher marginal rates. The language of the Virginia
statute is also in harmony with the federal Code with respect
to payment terms and extensions. "If the personal representa-
tive has obtained an extension of time for... paying the feder-
al estate tax. . . , the ... payment required by subsection C
shall be similarly extended . . . ."' Thus, payments of the Vir-
ginia estate tax may also be made over a period of ten years, if
30. See I.R.C. § 2011(a)-(b) (1993).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-902(A) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
32. Id. § 58.1-903(A).
33. Id. § 58.1-905(B).
1994] 453
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such permission is obtained with respect to the federal estate
tax.
An initial and a final calculation are necessary since the
taxable estate and the corresponding death taxes (federal and
state) will drop with each deduction for interest paid. The ini-
tial projection, with no deduction for interest, is for total estate
(death) taxes of $5,505,555. The final calculation, with deduc-
tions taken for $1,712,638 in interest, is for total estate taxes of
$4,563,605. The profile at the bottom of Table 1 simply depicts
the impact of these relationships on an annual basis. As can
readily be seen, the final adjustment in the year 2002 yields a
total death tax liability of $4,563,605. The sum of the annual
death tax payments aggregates to $4,563,605 as well, and the
cumulative death tax payment figure in the year 2002 mirrors
this number.
Table 2 describes the combined effects of the annual death
tax and interest payments in the ten years 1993-2002, as well
as the annual income tax payments in the entire twenty year
period (1992-2011). Income accruing to an estate is taxable'
"in the same manner as in the case of an individual... ,15
but at special rates prescribed for estates and trusts.6 Income
earned by the decedent before his death, and flowing to his
estate or directly to his designated beneficiaries after his death,
is considered income in respect of a decedent ("IRD")37 and is
subject to federal income tax under I.R.C § 61(a)(14). The sub-
ject of income in respect of a decedent is discussed at some
length in part I(F). For the purpose of understanding Table 2,
it is only necessary to recognize that the flow of income after a
decedent's death, attributable to the decedent's efforts before his
death, is considered taxable income for federal income tax pur-
poses in the year it is actually received.
The assumptions used in Table 2 include a 35% combined
federal and state income tax rate. The new maximum federal
34. See I.R.C. § 641(a) (1993).
35. Id. § 641(b) (1993).
36. See id. § 1(e) (1993). In both the pre- and post-1993 tax schedules; the maxi-
mum marginal rate for estates and trusts with taxable income exceeding $9,900 was
31%. Id.
37. See generally id. § 691 (1993).
454 [Vol. 28:443
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rate is 39.6%. Virginia imposes an income tax on estates and
trusts3 at the same rates as for individuals.39 The combined
maximum federal/state income tax for Virginia estates (and
individuals) is thus 45.35%.
40
Table 2 also assumes that the deduction for the federal es-
tate tax paid will be applied against the federal income tax
liability over the nineteen years (1993-2011) that jackpot
payouts are made to the estate or to designated beneficiaries.4'
The final assumption used in Table 2 is the immediate invest-
ment of any net lottery proceeds in an instrument earning
after-tax income of six percent.'
The real lesson to be derived from Table 2 is that the estate
begins to experience a positive cash flow in 1997, after three
years of deficits. (The cash flow is momentarily positive in 1993
since interest payments are not due until 1994.) Estate taxes
are completely liquidated after ten years (2002) and interest
payments are no longer required after the estate taxes are paid.
Over the twenty-year period of lottery payouts, the net proceeds
after payment of all taxes and interest aggregate to $7,984,541.
The deficits for the three years 1994-96 total $398,785. While
this deficit is not addressed in the Table 2 model by additional
38. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-360 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
39. See id. § 58.1-320. The maximum rate of 5.75% begins at annual taxable
income exceeding $17,000.
40. The maximum marginal income tax rates for estates and trusts were in-
creased in the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA 1993) to parallel the
increase in individual rates. The brackets, however, are considerably lower than those
for individuals. The 36% rate applies to estate or trust income from $5,501 to $7,500.
The 39.6% rate applies to all estate or trust income exceeding $7,500. See Baedeker,
supra note 4, at 815 (citing OBRA '93, §§ 13,201-05). Thus, Virginia estates with tax-
able income exceeding $17,000 are subject to the maximum Virginia rate, or 5.75%,
and the maximum federal rate, or 39.6%, for a combined rate of 45.35%.
41. See I.R.C. § 691(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1993). The deduction for federal estate taxes paid
may be allocated ratably over the years when the income is actually received. The
total federal estate tax paid (final calculation) as shown in Table 1 is $3,602,238.
Allocating this amount over 19 years yields a deduction of $189,591 for each year.
After subtracting this deduction from the annual payout of $1,000,000, the annual
taxable income is $810,409. At a 35% tax rate, the annual income tax liability is
$283,643. The income tax due in 1992, of course, reflects no such deduction, and the
full $1,000,000 is subject to the 35% tax rate.
42. At 1993 interest rates, an investment earning six percent in after-tax income
would probably be considered risky and beyond the reach of a prudent fiduciary. This
assumption affects only the last column in Table 2, Future Value of Net Proceeds,
and is, anyway, another story.
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borrowing, it should be noted that the positive cash flow in the
years 1992-93 totals $815,801."3 In summary, the estate of a
deceased lottery winner need not present an insoluble dilemma
to the decedent's estate or beneficiaries. Properly managed, the
problem can be resolved without bankrupting the estate, and
the beneficiaries can even realize an after-tax and after-
expenses total of almost $8 million. Having resolved the finan-
cial aspects of this issue, there remains the question of whether
this treatment is legally correct. We now turn our attention to
the legal questions.
E. The IRS Position-Treat As Annuity Pursuant to § 2039
When asked to comment on the problems confronting the
estate of a lottery winner-a large tax bill due to the present
value calculation, but relatively meager funds currently avail-
able-the Service's response was predictably not very satisfying:
The Internal Revenue Code specifically provides that the
decedent's gross estate would include the present value of
the right to receive all installments that had not been paid
prior to the date of death. Inclusion in the gross estate is
required whether the installments are payable to the pro-
bate estate or to a person who was designated by the jack-
pot winner before death. The present value of an install-
ment obligation, including installments payable by a state
lottery, is calculated by discounting each future installment
payment at the interest rate authorized under the Code
that is in effect for the month the decedent dies."
The analysis prepared for NAASPL in October 1992 notes
that the IRS "will require that the future lottery payments be
included in the gross estate pursuant to IRC § 2033 or the IRS
may alternatively take the position that the future lottery pay-
43. The net proceeds in 1992 are, of course, beyond the control of the executor or
the beneficiaries, at least during the period prior to the decedents death. One would
hope that at least some portion of the after-tax income in 1992 would remain intact.
The net proceeds in 1993 are either controlled by the executor or, if paid directly to
a beneficiary, subject to recovery by the executor in a civil judgment proceeding.
44. Kugler, supra note 1, at 1 (emphasis added).
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ments is [sic] an annuity which should be included in the gross
estate pursuant to IRC § 2039."
4
1
IRC § 2033 is the general taxing section of the estate tax
code: "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent
at the time of his death."' Other, more specific sections of the
Code, take precedence where they are applicable. Thus, IRC §
2039, Annuities, provides such statutory authority as exists for
treating future lottery payouts as an annuity:
The gross estate shall include the value of an annuity or
other payment receivable by any beneficiary by reason of
surviving the decedent under any form of contract or agree-
ment ... if, under such contract or agreement, an annuity
or other payment was payable to the decedent, or the dece-
dent possessed the right to receive such annuity or pay-
ment, either alone or in conjunction with another for his
life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to
his death or for any period which does not in fact end be-
fore his death.4
As previously discussed, the valuation of the annuity included
in the decedent's gross estate is its discounted present value. 
4
The Code and the Regulations are silent, however, with respect
to the threshold question of whether a future revenue stream of
lottery winnings is properly characterized as an annuity. The
Kugler memo asserts that it is, but does so without citing a
specific Code section or Regulation because, in fact, there are
none. Kenneth W. Thorson, Director of the Virginia Lottery,
believes that the Service makes its assertion based on the fact
that a revenue stream of lottery payments for a fixed number
of years "looks like" an annuity arrangement. He believes that
the Service, having seized upon an analogous "lookalike," refus-
es to recognize the inherent differences involved and chooses to
ignore the total absence of statutory or case law authority for
inclusion of lottery proceeds in the annuity classification.49
45. Winick memo, supra note 23, at 5.
46. I.R.C. § 2033 (1993).
47. I.R.C. § 2039(a) (1993).
48. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1984).
49. Interview with Kenneth W. Thorson, Director, Virginia Lottery, in Richmond,
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Perhaps the most fundamental flaw in treating lottery win-
nings as an annuity is the fact that the lottery winnings are
not alienable or assignable, while an annuity generally is.5"
The beneficiaries of a commercial annuity can, if necessary, sell
the annuity for its discounted present value, pay the estate tax
owed, and then reinvest what is left in another annuity or
possibly a different financial instrument. No such option is
available to Virginia beneficiaries of a deceased lottery winner.
Because the right to future payouts is not transferable, the
present value calculation is largely meaningless. As previously
discussed in part I(D), the tax problem can be managed. This
does not alter, however, the essential unfairness of levying a
tax upon a property right that, for practical purposes, cannot be
liquidated at all, much less for a value anywhere near the
value assigned for taxation purposes.
F. An "Unofficial" IRS Position-Treat as IRD under § 691
There is a "minority view" within the Service which believes
the official, annuity-like characterization is erroneous.
At least one IRS income tax official has suggested that
the income to the estate should be classified as income in
respect of a decedent (IRC § 691) and that his colleagues in
estate tax are incorrect in including the present value of the
entire future stream of prize payments in the gross estate
for estate tax purposes. According to this view, nothing
would be included in the gross estate for estate tax purpos-
es. 51
This "minority view" is only partially correct. The income
stream of future lottery payouts will be treated as income in
respect of a decedent and accordingly subjected to income taxa-
Va. (July 28, 1993).
50. Although this is the general rule, there are exceptions. Employer-provided
annuities, for example, are normally intended as a benefit and as income security to
the employee and his surviving spouse, and may contain provisions barring their sale
or assignment by the employee's successor in interest.
51. NAASPL Analysis, supra note 1, at 5.
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tion.52 However, treatment as IRD assumes that the property
right giving rise to the income has previously been taxed in the
decedent's estate, and a deduction is expressly allowed for this
prior payment of estate taxes. 3 The "minority view" is thus
patently incorrect in asserting that "nothing would be included
in the gross estate for estate tax purposes."54 However, the
anonymous official expressing the "minority view" does reach
the heart of the issue in his contention that the inclusion of the
present value of the entire future revenue stream in the gross
estate is erroneous.
At this point in our analysis, it seems beyond dispute that
lottery payouts received after the decedent's death are income
in respect of a decedent and are subject to income taxation in
the year actually received. It is equally indisputable that these
payments must be included in the decedent's estate and sub-
jected to the federal estate tax (with subsequent, ratable deduc-
tions against the future payouts subject to income taxes). The
unanswered question is how the stream of future payouts
should be valued for estate tax purposes. It would perhaps
simplify matters to permit the executor to keep the estate open
for the duration of the payouts (up to nineteen years for our
purposes), filing amended estate tax returns each year to reflect
the actual amounts flowing to the estate, rather than a dis-
counted present. value rendered highly speculative by the
illiquidity of the rights to those payments. However, such an
approach is apparently frowned upon.55
52. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(14) (1993).
53. See I.R.C. § 691(c) (1993).
54. NAASPL Analysis, supra note 1, at 5.
55. There is fairly strong authority for this proposition:
Claims are obviously difficult to value if they are unliquidated in
amount or subject to defenses, but this does not put them beyond the
reach of § 2033. Moreover, there is no room in the estate tax area for
the "open transaction" principle that sometimes permits taxpayers to
postpone the recognition of income when they receive property of inde-
terminate value. To avoid imposing the income tax on the basis of "mere
estimates, assumptions and speculation," the Supreme Court held in
Burnet v. Logan that the reporting of gain or loss on a sale for a contin-
gent deferred price can be deferred until the price is reduced to money
or can be valued with reasonable accuracy. In so holding, however, the
Court distinguished between the income tax, which is levied annually and
therefore can tolerate delay, and the estate tax, where "some valua-
tion-speculative or otherwise-[is] necessary in order to close the estate.
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Before addressing the question of valuation in more depth, it
may be helpful to the reader to give a short exposition of the
history and substance of I.R.C. § 691, Recipients of Income in
Respect of Decedents. Prior to 1934, income due but not re-
ceived by cash basis decedents prior to death escaped income
taxation.56 The 1934 Act equalized the tax treatment of cash
basis and accrual basis taxpayers,57 but the Act, and subse-
quent Supreme Court and lower court decisions had the effect
of bunching or "pyramiding" income, often "conjectural" or "in-
choate" in nature, into the decedent's estate for income tax pur-
poses.5" Ironically reminiscent of our present problem, the 1934
Act was found objectionable due to the possibility "that [income]
taxes, requiring current cash, might often be exacted at death
on amounts that might never be collected or where collections
would be long deferred." 9 Because of widespread criticism of
"bunching" income into one year which might be realized only
over a period of many years (exacerbated by steeply progressive
wartime tax rates), Congress acted to alleviate the problem
with the enactment of I.R.C. § 126.6" This precursor to the
5 BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFrs 125.7 (2d ed. 1993) (citations omitted) [hereinafter 5 BIrKER]. Burnet v.
Logan was decided in 1931. A more recent Tax Court opinion reiterates the principle:
The fact that the legal fees we are concerned with were contingent upon
future recovery by the Indian tribes is a critical consideration in trying
to determine what the contract right was worth as of the date of death.
However, the contingent nature of the contract right must bear on the
factual question of valuation. It cannot, as a matter of law, preclude the
inclusion of the interest in the decedent's gross estate or command that
the value be fixed at zero. Although uncertainty as to the value of a
contract right may postpone the inclusion of the income until it is actual-
ly realized for income tax purposes, for estate tax purposes, the value of
an asset must be determined in order to close the estate.
Estate of Curry v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 540, 546-47 (1980), acq. 1981-2 C.B. 1 (cita-
tions omitted).
56. See SEN. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934), 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B.
586, 608. The cash basis taxpayer was taxed on income he earned before his death,
and his estate was taxed on income earned by the estate after his death. Income
earned by the taxpayer prior to his death but received by his estate after his death
was "attributable to no one, and hence, [was] taxable to no one." Gilbert P. Verbit,
Income in Respect of a Decedent, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 419, 419-20 (1982).
57. See SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1942), 1942-2 C.B. 504,
579-83.
58. See John W. Drye, Jr., The Taxation of a Decedents Income, 8 TAX L. REV.
201, 202 (1952-53).
59. Id.
60. See Verbit, supra note 56, at 420-21; SEN. REP. No. 1631, supra note 57, at
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present I.R.C. § 691 introduced the concept of income in respect
of a decedent, which was specifically aimed at "avoid[ing] the
piling up of income in the decedent's final return."6' The cur-
rent I.R.C. § 691, enacted in the 1954 Code, is essentially un-
62changed from the 1942 version. The congressional concern
manifested in 1942 for mismatched income and income taxes is,
fifty odd years later, seemingly nowhere to be found with re-
spect to estate assets and estate taxes.
Curiously, neither § 126 of the 1942 Code nor § 691 of the
1954 (and current 1993) Code, defines the term "income in re-
spect of a decedent." Professors Bittker and Lokken, after dis-
filling the literature, offer the following:
Items of income in respect of a decedent ... are pay-
ments received toward satisfaction of a right or expectancy
created almost entirely through the efforts or status of the
decedent and which, except for his death and without fur-
ther action on his part, the decedent would have realized as
gross income ....
First, the item of income must have been taxable to the
decedent had he survived to the time the income was real-
ized. This is to say, the income must have been attributable
to his services, his sales, or his income-producing property.
Second, although the decedent must have become "enti-
tled" to the income by his death, his rights must not have
matured sufficiently to require inclusion of the income in
his final income tax return under the accounting method
employed by him. This return, normally filed by the execu-
tor, is prepared on the decedent's regular method of ac-
counting without reference to any items which might have
become accruable solely because of death ....
Third, what is transferred at death must be a passive
right to receive income, as distinguished from "property"
entitled to a [date of death basis under § 1014].
Fourth, the recipient of the right to the income in ques-
tion must have acquired it solely by reason of the death of
the taxpayer who created it. This characteristic subjects in-
come in respect of a decedent to two important limitations,
580; H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83-88 (1942); 4 HOUSE REPORTS 82,
83-88 (1942).
61. See Drye, supra note 58, at 203 (citing SEN. REP, No. 1631; H.R. REP. No.
2333).
62. See Verbit, supra note 56, at 422.
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each of which sheds further light upon the basic concept:
First, § 691 presupposes a gratuitous transfer from a dece-
dent at death of a right to income. Second, the ultimate
proceeds must be received solely because of the taxpayer's
passive status as the decedent's transferee of the specific
right.
In analyzing the elements of this extended definition, we are
reinforced in our earlier assertion that future lottery payouts
constitute IRD. Clearly, the payments are the product of the
decedent's activities and would have been taxed as income to
him but for his death. Equally clearly, the decedent's rights to
the future income are not sufficiently mature (since by statute
the payments cannot be accelerated upon his death) so as to
warrant their inclusion in the decedent's final income tax
return.
The third element, the distinction between a right to receive
income and the property which produces that income, is impor-
tant in some tax contexts but not in ours. If the "income rights"
to the future income stream are classified as "property," their
value will be the fair market value at the date of the decedent's
death' and any subsequent disposition of the property will
receive the benefit of this stepped up basis. Since the fair mar-
ket value at the moment of the decedent's death can be deter-
mined through discounting to present value or otherwise, and
since this figure is greater than the decedent's essentially zero
cost basis (one dollar), the step up in basis might be potentially
advantageous. But two statutory provisions preclude this poten-
tial advantage. First, the step up in basis is specifically denied
to IRD. 5 Second, since the beneficiaries cannot dispose of the
"property," there is no advantage to our beneficiaries at dispo-
sition. Under the Virginia State Lottery Law, the "property" is
to be "held in the name of the Department or the Common-
wealth and not in the name of the prize winner. Any claim of a
prize winner to a future payment remains inchoate until the
63. 3 BORIS I. BITIKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, Es-
TATES AND GIFTS 91 83.1.2 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter 3 BITrKER] (citing M. CARR
FERGUSON ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND BENEFICIARIES 146-48
(1970)).
64. See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (1993).
65. See I.R.C. § 1014(c) (1993).
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date the payment is due .... For our purposes then, the
basis of the "property" has no significance under current Virgin-
ia law, and the distinction between "property" and "income
rights" is largely unimportant.
The final definitional element is clearly satisfied: but for the
decedent's death, she would have continued to receive the pay-
ments; because of her death, the beneficiaries gratuitously re-
ceive the payments by standing in the shoes of the decedent as
her transferees.
Having fully satisfied ourselves that the future lottery pay-
ments are, indeed, IRD, it may be profitable to set aside the
question of valuation for the moment, and to examine how
other income streams are treated for estate tax purposes. In the
following section, seven categories of revenue streams are de-
scribed and analyzed. The ultimate question of valuation will be
revisited later in part V.
II. FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF OTHER INCOME STREAMS
A. Rental Income from Long Term Leases
Unlike the income rights to future lottery payments whose
underlying property is an intangible contract, the rental income
from a long term lease is supported by tangible property, itself
having a definite value. If a landlord dies holding property
leased to another for ninety-nine years, his estate will consist of
a term of years (or tenancy for years)67 and a remainder. The
landlord's death does not normally terminate the lease and the
property passes to his heirs subject to the leasehold." For our
purposes, the question becomes one of distinguishing the value
of the underlying property from the value of the stream of
rental payments which comprise the term of years. 9
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-4013(B) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
67. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 2.17, 6.14
(1984).
68. Id. § 6.83.
69. Although tangible property (especially real property) is usually thought of as
having some intrinsic worth or value, it is difficult, for valuation purposes, to fully
separate the intrinsic worth from the income producing value dictated by the market-
place. Consider, for example, two office buildings of identical size and design, built
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Standard actuarial methods can be employed to divide the
value of an estate between the present possessory interest (here
the term of years) and the future interest (here the remain-
der).70 However, to arrive at the total value for estate tax pur-
poses, this is not strictly required. Essentially, the underlying
property which is the subject of the lease must be valued, and
that value must then be included in the gross estate.7' Then
the income from the term of years must be separated between
the time periods before and after the decedent's death, with the
former constituting IRD and the latter constituting ordinary in-
come to the estate. If the leasehold property is an office build-
ing, for example, the value of the land and the building must
be determined and this value may be apportioned between the
present and future interests. "[T]hese interests are valued by
determining the fair market value of the underlying property
and dividing this value among the several interests in the prop-
erty."72 Since the property is subject to a long term lease, the
rents accruing over the term would serve as the foundation for
valuation purposes with some salvage value of the building and
land value ascribed in addition. Once this is done (with the
rents reduced to present value), the actuarial tables prescribed
in the regulations may be used to apportion the value,73 but
contemporaneously and adjacent to each other. Their intrinsic worths would be the
same. But if one were quickly leased to a quality tenant for a long term lease with
terms favorable to the owner, while the other sat vacant, the "values" of the two
buildings would soon diverge. If the rental market then turned down due to a reces-
sion or overcapacity, the "values" of the buildings would be decidedly different, at
least in market, or rent producing terms. Conversely, if the first building were leased
at "normal" terms and the market then improved due to lack of capacity, the second
building might command a long term lease at terms better than the first. Thus, it
can be said that property values are a function of both intrinsic worth and market
conditions at any given moment.
70. See BORIS I. BITKER & ELIAS CLARK, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
568 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BITTKER & CLARK]; Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1984).
71. See I.R.C. § 2033 (1993). See also United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 172
(5th Cir. 1962) (holding that the estate tax "is an excise tax on the transfer of prop-
erty at death and not a tax on the property transferred;" further holding that the
moment-of-death value controls for estate tax purposes), cert. denied 371 U.S. 862
(1962).
72. See 5 BrIrKER, supra note 55, 135.4.10. See also Hanley v. United States,
63 F. Supp.' 73, 80 (Ct. Cl. 1945) (holding that the value of a life estate is deter-
mined by the annual income, the length of time it is expected to continue and the
annual return on investment).
73. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1984), supra note 4, with additional explanation
in that note.
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again, for estate tax purposes, this is not strictly necessary.
What then must be apportioned is the income stream gener-
ated by the property, this time between the periods before and
after the decedent's death:
Where the decedent dies during a rent period, only the
net proceeds attributable to the portion of the rent period
ending with his death are income in respect of a decedent.
The proceeds attributable to the portion of the rent period
which runs from the day after death to the end of the rent
period are ordinary income to the estate.74
Thus, the "property" may be seen as being composed of two
parts. The term of years and the remainder are collectively
included in the decedent's gross estate along with the rental
income characterized as IRD, the rents earned prior to the
decedent's death but collected afterwards. The term of years
and the remainder will be subject to the estate tax only and
will be eligible for the I.R.C. § 1014 step up in basis; while the
IRD portion will be subject to both the estate tax and income
taxes, with a deduction for the estate tax paid when computing
the income tax liability. The rent attributable to the periods
after the decedent's death is considered income of the estate or
of the beneficiaries, depending on whether it is earned before or
after the closing of the estate, and is subject to income tax
only.
75
The estate must be closed within a reasonable time.76 The
rents actually received attributable to the period after the
decedent's death and prior to the closing of the estate must be
used to compute the income taxes owed on the estate's final
income tax return. The rents for subsequent periods will, of
course, be taxable to the beneficiaries as income to them 77
74. Rev. Rul. 64-289, 1964-2 C.B. 173.
75. See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (1993); see also National Bank of Commerce v. Mathis,
61-2 U.S.T.C. 9,744 (E.D.Ark. 1961) (holding that rent on farm land earned but not
collected for period before decedent's death was IRD); Waldrop v. United States, 137
F. Supp. 753 (Ct. Cl. 1956) (holding that income earned by the estate during admin-
istration is not part of the gross estate for estate tax purposes and is not taxable as
such, but is taxable to the estate as income).
76. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
77. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(5) (1993).
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B. Distributions from Qualified Retirement Plans
Benefits available to employees and their beneficiaries are
widely available through a variety of pension plans. These
plans are intricately regulated by Code §§ 401 through 418E.
Under § 401, employees are not taxed on these benefits when
they are initially set aside, but are taxed on them as income
under § 402 when the benefits are distributed. Employers re-
ceive deductions under § 404 in the year the employer contribu-
tions are set aside.78
Estate taxation of these benefits is authorized under § 2039,
Annuities, enacted in 1954."9 As originally enacted, § 2039(c)
exempted these benefits from estate taxation, causing qualified
pension and profit sharing plans to be known as "the quint-
essential tax shelter."0 The unlimited exemption was, howev-
er, trimmed back in 1982 and § 2039(c) was repealed altogether
in 1984 for persons dying after that year. "It was reasoned that
the unlimited marital deduction protects qualified plan benefits
payable to the surviving spouse from taxation and that benefits
payable to others should be subject to tax when the estate
exceeds the unified credit.""' The subject of the marital deduc-
tion and its potential role in sheltering lottery payments to an
estate or directly to beneficiaries is addressed in part VII(A) of
this article.
Section 2039 now consists only of subsections (a) and (b).
These two subsections define the parameters for including em-
ployee retirement benefits in the employee's gross estate. First,
the benefits must be in the form of "an annuity or other pay-
ment receivable by any beneficiary by reason of surviving the
decedent .... ,,12 "The payment may be conditional or uncondi-
tional, and may include one or more payments extending over
any period of time.8"
78. See I.R.C. §§ 401-418E (1993).
79. See BIIrrTR & CLARK, supra note 70, at 327 (discussing § 2039).
80. Id. at 328.
81. Id.
82. I.R.C. § 2039(a) (1993). See generally Estate of Schelberg v. Commissioner,
612 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that § 2039 only reaches annuities payable, ac-
tually or potentially, to the decedent and the survivor and that payments to the
survivor alone are not brought into the gross estate under § 2039).
83. Charles L. Feldman, Estate Planning for Employee Retirement and Death
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Second, the payments must be receivable "under any form of
contract or agreement . . . ."' If the employer was contractu-
ally bound to make the payments, these amounts are covered
by § 2039.85 Even if the plan was not the subject of bargaining
between the employer and employee, a contract may be in-
ferred.
While one can argue that a plan voluntarily and unilateral-
ly adopted by an employer is not a contract within the
meaning of Section 2039, the Service and the courts have
generally concluded that such a plan is adopted by reason
of the employment relationship and thus the plan consti-
tutes a contract.8 6
Third, the annuity or other payment must have been "pay-
able to the decedent, or the decedent possessed the right to
receive such annuity or payment, either alone or in conjunction
with another .... .87 The annuity or payment must have been
the product of a private plan. Government funded plans such as
social security8 or the Railroad Retirement Act89 are not in-
cluded in the decedent's gross estate under § 2039. This is
because their funding results from a statute, rather than a
contract, and because the source of their funding is taxes that
have already been paid by either the employee or the
company.9"
Finally, these rules apply only to "such part of the value of
the annuity or other payment ... as is proportionate to that
part of the purchase price therefor contributed by the dece-
dent ... [or his] employer or former employer .... "" Contri-
Benefits, 171 PLIEST. 173, PLI Order No. D4-5191 (1986) (citing Treas. Reg. §
20.2039-1(b) (1976)).
84. I.R.C. § 2039(a) (1993).
85. See Estate of Bahen v. United States, 305 F.2d 827 (1962) (company plan
deemed irrevocable).
86. Feldman, supra note 83, § V.D.L.(ii).
87. I.R.C. § 2039(a) (1993).
88. See Rev. Rul. 81-182, 1981-2 C.B. 179.
89. See Rev. Rul. 60-70, 1960-1 C.B. 372, modified by Rev. Rul. 73-316, 1973-2
C.B. 318.
90. See BITIrER & CLARK, supra note 70, at 338-39.
91. I.R.C. § 2039(b) (1993).
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butions by the employer because of the employment relationship
are imputed to the employee.2
The value of the "annuity or other payment" for estate tax
purposes is calculated based on the present value of the future
stream of payments, based on the life expectancy of the benefi-
ciary. 3 As noted, the unlimited marital deduction will shield
the surviving spouse from the estate tax, but non-spousal bene-
ficiaries will be subject to the tax within nine months of the
decedent's death.
4
When the annuity payments are actually received by a bene-
ficiary, they constitute income in respect of a decedent.95 As
such the estate tax previously paid may be deducted in comput-
ing the survivor's income tax liability.96
C. Royalty Income from Patents and Copyrights
Like rental income from long term leases, discussed in part
II(A), it is necessary in the case of intellectual property to dis-
tinguish between the income stream, or royalties, flowing from
the property and the underlying property itself. In the case of
intellectual property, however, the underlying property, unlike a
parcel of land or a building, seldom has any tangible worth in
its own right. The plans and specifications for an invention, for
example, or the manuscript for a book, could be worth no more
than a few dollars insofar as paper and ink are concerned. Still,
this underlying property, to the extent it is protected by nation-
al and, increasingly, international intellectual property cove-
nants,97 is often quite valuable, and its intrinsic worth may be
great despite its absence of tangible value.
92. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(c) (1976).
93. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1984).
94. See I.R.C. § 6075(a) (1993).
95. See Miller v. United States, 389 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1968) (monthly payments
by employer to decedent's widow were income in respect of a decedent); Feldman, su-
pra note 83, § V.F. & n.184 (citing Rev. Rul. 73-327, 1973-2 C.B. 214 (survivor bene-
fit payments pursuant to decedents employment contract are income in respect of a
decedent and are included in survivor's gross income).
96. See I.R.C. § 691(c) (1993).
97. See generally WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, BACKGROUND
READING MATERIAL ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1988).
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The intrinsic worth or property value of intellectual property
is, of course, a function of the anticipated royalties which will
flow from the publication of the work or the manufacture and
sale of the product. The valuation techniques employed are
often esoteric and industry-specific. For example, the motion
picture industry, through long experience, has developed a for-
mula by which projected royalties can be estimated. 8 When
contested by the Service, the parties almost invariably resort to
expert witnesses. 9 At least as far back as 1939, the courts
have used the discounted present value of the future royalties
in establishing their value for estate tax purposes.' In a
more recent (gift tax) case, the court's opinion set forth the
expert's methodology in, detail.'0 '
The now-familiar IRD treatment is widely applicable to inter-
ests in patent and copyright royalties.0 2 However, the precise
nature of the decedent's interest must be ascertained. If the
inventor-decedent or author-decedent had sold his patent or
copyright to a manufacturer or publisher, and his proceeds were
to be paid in installments, his interest would have matured to
the point that post mortem installments would be considered
IRD. On the other hand, if the decedent had merely licensed
98. See Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606, 630 (1968) (citing with approval the
methodology used by an "established industry"); Rev. Rul. 65-192, 1965-2 C.B. 259
(holding that the formula approach may be used to value intangibles absent a better
approach), superseded by Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327 (defining the "formula"
approach and expanding on the earlier ruling).
99. See Estate of Pascal v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M.(CCH) 1766 (1963) (opinion of
petitioner's expert discounted as having no "real basis").
100. See Estate of Pedro Pacheco Martinez, 1939 B.TAM. (P-H) % 39,223 (fair
market value of royalties calculated on basis of present worth for estate tax purpos-
es).
101. See Smith v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M.(CCH) 1427 (1981). The Service's expert
calculated the value of the disputed patents as follows:
His approach largely paralleled that of petitioner's expert, multiplying (a)
the potential market (50,000 units) by (b) anticipated market penetration
(3 percent), by (c) unit cost ($1,000), by (d) a reasonable royalty rate (1
percent), and then discounting the result for the present value of money
(.6). In addition, he considered patent validity (75 percent) and technolog-
ical feasibility (50 percent). Multiplying all of these figures together [the
expert] determined the fair market value of the U.S. patents at
$3,375-which he rounded to $3,500.
Id. at 1428.
102. See Alan D. Seget, Estate Planning for Intellectual and Creative Property, in
ESTATE PLANNING FOR THE INusUAL ASsET, 153 PLIEsT. 123, 133, PLI Order No.
D4-5170 (1984).
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the intellectual property to a manufacturer or publisher, the
decedent's interest would be analogous to the landlord holding a
long term lease; payments attributable to the periods after the
decedent's death would be classified as ordinary income to ei-
ther the estate or the beneficiaries.
Problems can arise in characterizing receipts as "rent" or
"royalty" income, on the one hand, or "sale proceeds" or
"joint venture" income, on the other. The difference is sig-
nificant in many contexts, including Section 691. Thus, the
IRS has ruled that where an arrangement between an au-
thor and a publisher, or between an inventor and a user,
constitutes a "sale" of a manuscript or invention made prior
to death, all receipts will constitute IRD. On the other
hand, where the arrangement is regarded as a license, re-
ceipts attributable to post-death sales or profits will be
ordinary income, and in most cases the underlying property
interest passing to the author's or inventor's successors will
receive a stepped-up, amortizable basis under Sections 1014
[Basis of Property Acquired from a Decedent] and 167 [De-
preciation]."'0
D. Income from Oil and Gas Interests
The unique nature of oil and gas (and hard mineral) proper-
ties and their concomitant unique tax treatment make them
possibly the least apposite candidates for purposes of compari-
103. NORMAN H. LANE & HoWARD M. ZARITSKY, FEDERAL INcoMfE TAXATION OF Es-
TATES AND TRUSTS I 15.05[3][e] (1988) (citing Rev. Rul. 57-544, 1957-2 C.B. 361
(1957), distinguished by Rev. Rul. 60-227, 1960-1 C.B. 262 (1960)). The earlier ruling
was ambiguously worded, using terms such as "contract" and "transferred to the pub-
lishers the sole right to publish" instead of the unambiguous "sale" or "license." Rev.
Rul. 57-544. The later ruling "clarified" the earlier:
In summary, it is concluded that if a contract entered into between an
inventor and a manufacturer constitutes merely a "license" to use the
inventor's patent in return for the payment of royalties, and not a "sale,"
royalty payments due and accrued under the contract at the date of
death of the inventor constitute income in respect of a decedent under
section 691(a) of the Code. Where the contract constitutes a "license,"
royalty payments accrued after the date of death of the inventor are
ordinary income includible in the gross income of the recipient under sec-
tion 61 of the Code.
Rev. Rul. 60-227.
470 [Vol. 28:443
LOTTERY WINNINGS OF A DECEDENT
son with lottery payouts. Nonetheless, some analogies can be
drawn, and thus a brief discussion is appropriate.
The defining characteristic of mineral properties is the wast-
ing of assets. The store of mineral wealth is finite and once
depleted, the asset is worthless. Land is not depreciable be-
cause its life is considered infinite. Buildings are depreciable,
but may be repaired and refurbished to extend their useful
lives more or less indefinitely. But with oil and gas, "[tlhe
quantity of hydrocarbons within a formation is finite. When it
is depleted, the value of the underlying asset is exhausted and
consequently, so is the value of any mineral rights, royalties, or
other interests."' 4
The second unique characteristic of mineral properties is that
ownership of the mineral estate (extraction rights) may be le-
gally severed from surface ownership. In the case of oil and
gas, the mineral estate may be subdivided into drilling and
production rights and the rights to income therefrom. Typically,
the landowner or owner of the mineral estate signs a lease with
a driller under which the landowner receives a fixed fraction of
all production as royalties, with the driller or lessee retaining
the balance as his "working" or "operating" interest.0 5 For
purposes of comparison with lottery payouts, we are most inter-
ested in the landowner's royalties, but to arrive at a value for
this component interest, we must first reach a valuation for the
property as a whole.
The valuation of oil and gas properties, like the valuation of
patents and copyrights, is the subject of frequently conflicting
expert opinion. Nonetheless, several criteria have been devel-
oped and have received wide recognition by the Service and the
courts:
1. An actual sale of the property or a fractional interest
therein.
2. Actual sales of comparable properties.
3. Valuations for purposes other than Federal taxation.
4. Engineer's appraisals, i.e., analytical appraisals.
5. Bona fide offers to sell or purchase the property.
104. James W. Buchanan, III, Valuation and Taxation of Transfers of Oil and Gas
Interests to Charities, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 561, 564 (1987).
105. Id. at 562.
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6. Opinions of people who buy and sell similar oil and
gas properties.
7. Opinions of operators of oil and gas properties."6
The Service relies on these factors in various combinations,
but generally prefers the factors that draw on actual market
experience, as opposed to seemingly precise analytical
appraisals.0 7 The Regulations support this preference, pro-
scribing valuation by analytical appraisals if "value .. .can be
determined upon the basis of cost or comparative values ... or
[i]f the fair market value can reasonably be determined by ainy
other method."0 8
The Regulations go on to provide the criteria to be analyzed
when using the alternative, engineering-based approach. 9 In
using this alternative approach to valuing oil and gas proper-
ties, the Regulations specify that the present value of the fu-
ture extractions shall be calculated. In this respect, there is a
close analogy between the valuation of oil and gas properties
and the valuation of a future stream of lottery payments as
manifested in current IRS policy."' However, the Regulations
mandate the determination of fair market value as the basis of
any valuation"' and elsewhere define fair market value as
"the price at which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any com-
pulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge
of relevant facts.""'
There is thus an inconsistency between the Service's ap-
proach to the valuation of a stream of lottery payments as op-
posed to its preference in valuing oil and gas properties. With
respect to oil and gas properties, the Service clearly prefers
106. Donald G. Williamson, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Oil and Gas Prop-
erties, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 173, 180 (1967) (citing Leland E. Fiske, Valuation and Oil
Properties, 13 OKLA. L. REV. 267 (1960)).
107. See Buchanan, supra note 104, at 566.
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(d)(2) (1972).
109. See Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(e) (1972).
110. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
111. See Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(d) (1972).
112. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965).
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valuation based on fair market value as determined by actual
sales of comparable properties and other market-related indicia.
There is no need to consider present value; find a "comparable"
and use it as a benchmark to extrapolate a value for the prop-
erty being assessed. The analytical appraisal, with its reliance
on projecting future extractions and then reducing these to
their present value, is clearly a less preferred method of valua-
tion as far as the Service is concerned. However, in its stated
policy towards future lottery payouts, the IRS mandates the
calculation of a present value from the future revenue stream.
In so doing, the Service eschews any approach more closely tied
to actual market conditions which are measured by the price
arrived at by the willing buyer-willing seller approach. The IRS
policy could possibly be defended since, under Virginia law,
there is no willing buyer (alienation or assignment being pro-
hibited) and thus no real marketplace. But there is a theoreti-
cal market and a theoretical price at which a buyer could be
found to unburden the winner's estate of its problem. This
theoretical solution (consistent with the Service's professed
desire to mimic market conditions) will be addressed in depth
in part V.
To conclude our discussion of oil and gas properties, it need
only be noted that the value of the property on the date of the
decedent's death (or the alternate valuation date) must be used
in computing the estate tax. If the owner is also the driller, the
full value is included in the owner-decedent's gross estate. If
the owner has leased the mineral rights to a driller and has
retained rights to only a fixed fraction of the future extractions
as royalties, the owner-decedent's fractional share of the total
value is the amount included in his gross estate.
E. Income from Financial Instruments, e.g. Bonds
In general, the value assigned to stocks or bonds held by the
decedent is the fair market value on the date of death (or the
alternate valuation date). This value, in the case of publicly
traded securities, is normally the mean of the highest and low-
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est quoted selling prices for the date of valuation or, if neces-
sary, the mean of the bid and asked prices."'
If the decedent dies holding a bond and attached coupons
evidencing a right to future income, the valuation for estate tax
purposes would be the principal amount of the bond as well as
the amount of the coupons discounted to their respective matu-
rities.1 This is entirely consistent with the general principle
that "whenever a person dies owning a right to future income
the value of this right is taxable to his estate under the estate
tax. 11 5
If the decedent died holding federal redeemable bonds, or
"flower bonds," these bonds may be submitted at par value to
pay federal estate taxes."' Because of this, they are included
in the decedent's gross estate at par value (as opposed to mar-
ket value) and are taxed accordingly."7
One of the most common assets found in estates of all sizes
is the U.S. Series "EE," or the older Series "E," savings bond.
Other than their discounted sale prices (fifty percent and seven-
ty-five percent of face value, respectively), they are equivalent
and are subject to equal tax treatment."8 Unlike coupon
bonds, U.S. savings bonds do not pay interest to the bondholder
on a periodic basis. Rather, the bonds accrue interest, building
toward face value. Accrual basis taxpayers must compute the
accrued interest annually and report it as income, while cash
basis taxpayers may defer federal income tax until redemption
(savings bonds are exempt from state income tax)."'
113. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2 (1992).
114. See CHARLES L. LOWNDES & ROBERT KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT
TAxES 47 (2d ed. 1962).
115. Id.
116. See RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIF TAXATION
I 4.02[31[e] (6th ed. 1991).
117. See BITTKER & CLARK, supra note 70, at 579 (citing Bankers Trust Co. v.
United States, 284 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 903 (1961)); Rev.
Rul. 69-489, 1969-2 C.B. 172.
118. See Michael E. O'Connor, U.S. Savings Bonds in the Estate, 64 N.Y. ST. B.J.
39, 39 (1992).
119. Id. at 39 (citing 31 C.F.R. § 353.30 (1979); 31 C.F.R. § 351.8(a) (1990)).
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The interest accrued, but not realized, at the death of the
decedent is considered income earned by him and is treated as
income in respect of a decedent, subject to both the estate tax
and income tax. The date of death redemption value of the
bonds (with interest computed to that date) is included in the
gross estate. Interest accrued after that date is considered ordi-
nary income, reportable on. the estate's income tax return.2 '
Since the bonds are invariably redeemed before closing the
estate, there is no stream of future income to discount for
estate tax purposes. A beneficiary named on the bond may,
however, continue to defer taxation. If the bonds are owned by
the decedent alone, they may not be reissued after his death to
a beneficiary of the estate without first recognizing the income
and paying the tax. But if a beneficiary is named on the bond,
that beneficiary may continue to hold the bond without recog-
nizing the gain. The gain will be recognized only when the
named beneficiary redeems the bond. The bonds are not permit-
ted a section 1014 step up in basis when the named beneficiary
redeems them.'2
F. Distribution of Interest in Partnerships or S-Corporations
The estate and income tax treatment of installment distribu-
tions of a decedent's interest in a partnership or subchapter-S
corporation is complex and can receive only the most cursory
examination here. The starting point in any analysis is to de-
termine the value of the partnership or corporation, For valua-
tion purposes, we will examine the criteria applicable to closely
held corporations and extend those criteria to partnerships.'22
The Service, in a widely quoted ruling, has listed eight factors
to be considered:
(a) The nature of the business and the history of the
enterprise from its inception.
(b) The economic outlook in general and the condition
and outlook of the specific industry in particular.
120. Id. at 40 (citing I.R.C. § 691(c)(1) (1992)).
121. Id. at 41.
122. See STEPHENS, supra note 116, 4.02[3][fl & nn.66-67 (citations omit-
ted)(observing that shares of closely held corporations, for estate tax purposes, are
those shares not normally traded and for which no value is readily available, and
that unincorporated business interests are valued in the same manner).
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(c) The book value of the stock and the financial condi-
tion of the business.
(d) The earning capacity of the company.
(e) The dividend-paying capacity.
(f) Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other
intangible value.
(g) Sales of the stock and the size of the block of stock to
be valued.
(h) The market price of stocks of corporations engaged in
the same or a similar business, whose stocks are actively
traded in a free and open market, either on an exchange or
over-the-counter.12
Despite the repeated references to "stock," the Regulations
and a ruling make it clear that the applicable criteria should be
used in valuing unincorporated businesses as well as closely
held corporations.124 "[Tihere is no regular market to turn to,
and the value of the assets must be considered in the light of
other factors. The Regulations place a special emphasis on
goodwill in such situations, as it is often a major intangible
asset in unincorporated businesses."125
Once the partnership or corporation has been valued, the
proportionate share owned by the decedent is the amount to be
included in the gross estate. Frequently this amount cannot be
taken out of the business in the year of death, due to the
illiquidity of the partnership or corporation, and the other as-
sets of the estate may not be sufficient to pay the estate tax. If
the decedent's share of the value of the closely held business
exceeds thirty-five percent of his adjusted gross estate, and his
interest in the business is at least twenty percent of the
business' total capitalization, the estate is eligible to pay the
estate tax in installments. Even though interest is payable on
the unpaid amounts, the interest paid is deductible as an
123. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, modified by, Rev. Rul. 65-193, 1965-2 C.B.
370, and amplified by Rev. Rul. 77-287, 1977-2 C.B. 319, Rev. Rul. 80-123, 1980-2
C.B. 101, Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170. The ruling is a lengthy one and ad-
dresses the weight to be accorded the various factors, the effect of restrictive agree-
ments on the value to be assigned, the relationships of the parties and the relative
number of shares held by the decedent. Id. at 242-44..124. See STEPHENS, supra note 116, 4.02[3][f]; Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3 (1992);
Rev. Rul 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327 (1968).
125. Id.
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administrative expense of the estate, and the estate tax may be
spread over a period of fourteen years from the date the tax
otherwise would be due. 2 6
For purposes of comparison with a revenue stream of lottery
payments, we must next examine how distributions of partner-
ship or close corporation interests over time are taxed.
Partners and partnerships are taxed under subchapter-K of
the Code. As a general principle, a partnership interest is con-
sidered property, as opposed to IRD, and the property acquires
a stepped up basis at the decedent's death.2 1 The property is
assigned a date of death value and is subject to the estate tax
only. There are, however, three exceptions to the general rule,
and for many estates of partner-decedents, the exceptions may
be more important than the rule. First, if the decedent's estate
receives the former partner's unrealized receivables as a distrib-
utive share of the partnership's income, or as a guaranteed
payment, pursuant to I.R.C. § 736(a), the receivables are con-
sidered IRD under §§ 753 and 691, and their present value is
included in the gross estate.128 Second, the decedent's fraction-
al share of partnership income attributable to the period before
the deceased partner's death is considered IRD. 29 Finally, the
decedent's interest in certain "partnership level" unrealized
receivables is also considered IRD."30 In all three instances,
the decedent's right to any periodic payments is reduced to
present value and subjected to the estate tax and, subsequently,
to income tax.
Distributions from S-corporations to a decedent-shareholder's
estate are treated quite differently from partnership distribu-
tions. When a shareholder dies, the shareholder's portion of the
126. See generally Richard Z. Kabaker, Deferral of Estate Tax under Section 6166,
C756 ALI-ABA 517 (1992); David W. Reinecke, Post-Mortem Tax and Estate Planning,
9 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 383 (1992); Martin R. Goodman, Tax Elections for Closely
Held Businesses: IRC Sections 303, 6166 and 2032A, 201 PLI/EST. 155, PLI Order No.
D4-5220 (1991).
127. See LANE & ZARITSKY, supra note 103, T 15.06[1][a] (citing I.R.C. §§ 742,
1014 (1992)).
128. Id. 15.06[1][b].
129. Id. 15.06[1][c] (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(c)(3)(v) (1987)).
130. Id. I 15.06[1][d] (citing Quick Trust v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1336, affd per
curiam, 444 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1971); Woodhal v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH)
1438 (1969), affd, 454 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1972); Rev. Rul. 66-325, 1966-2 C.B. 249).
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corporation's profits for the year is normally prorated according
to time: if the date of death occurs halfway through the
corporation's taxable year, for example, half of the decedent's
share of the corporation's profits is reported on his individual
return as ordinary income, and half is reported on the estate's
return as ordinary income.' With the concurrence of all
shareholders including the decedent's estate, the decedent's
share can be calculated by an interim closing of the books."'
"Given this pattern, neither any corporate profits nor any distri-
butions should ever constitute IRD.""' As a further demon-
stration of the favorable treatment accorded decedent-share-
holders of S-corporations,
[distributions to the estate will generally be tax free unless
the corporation had accumulated earnings and profits in
years when it was not an S corporation. In this case, distri-
butions may be taxed as dividends to the extent of such
accumulated earnings and profits, once all post-S earnings
are distributed."'
G. Income from Installment Sales
The treatment of proceeds from the sale of property pursuant
to I.R.C. § 453, Installment Method, is fairly straightforward.
When the obligee of the transaction dies before collecting all
the installments, the remaining installments are payable to the
obligee's estate. As a general rule, post mortem proceeds in the
form of installment sale payments are considered IRD to the
extent of gain on the sale. Installment payments representing
basis not yet recovered are not IRD and are not taxable." 5
The interaction of sections 453 and 691 occasionally produces
complexities, but the law in this part of the Code is relatively
well settled."3 6
131. Id. 91 15.06[2] (citing I.R.C. §§ 1366(a), 1377(a)(1) (1992)).
132. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 1377(a)(2) (1992)).
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 1368(c) (1992)).
135. Id. 15.07[l] (citing I.R.C. § 691(a)(4) (1992)).
136. This was not always true. For a good historical sketch of the statutory and
case law, as well as a discussion of the legal and economic theories that supported
the law's development, see Note, Sales Transactions and Income in Respect of a De-
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In almost all cases, the transaction will involve the sale of
property.1 7 Because property in the hands of the obligee will
have a basis (even if the basis is zero), the installment proceeds
must be segregated to reflect recoupment of basis as well as
gain on the transaction. Post-mortem proceeds flowing to the
decedent's estate retain the same character they would have
had if they had flowed directly to the obligee.' Thus, if the
sale represented a capital transaction, the gain to the obligee
would have been a capital gain and the IRD (after recoupment
of basis) would represent capital gains insofar as income taxa-
tion of the IRD is concerned. The estate tax would apply simply
to the present value of the future installments, irrespective of
the capital or ordinary gain character of the proceeds.
Special rules prevent the estate (or the beneficiaries) from
selling or assigning the rights to installment payments in order
to escape taxes. For example:
If the estate or legatee sells, transfers to a nonqualified
successor, or collects the installment obligation at other
than its face amount, IRD income is realized to the extent
of the greater of (1) the amount realized on the disposition
or (2) the fair market value of the obligation, over the
decedent's basis in the obligation.3 9
The Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980140 added §
691(a)(5) which prevents avoidance of the tax by the expedient
of the obligee bequeathing the note to the obligor:
Since 1980, the Code has included a specific rule to deal
with cases where the decedent bequeaths an installment
obligation held by him or her before death to the obligor of
the payment. When this occurs, any previously unrealized
gain inherent in the receivable at the time the decedent
cedent, 3 GA. L. REV. 606, 607 (1969).
137. Contracts for the installment payment of personal services, such as a large
legal or medical bill payable over a number of years, are not included. Such bills
would normally be reflected in the receivables of the obligee and, in the event of the
obligee's death would be subject to the treatment described in part II (F).
138. See I.R.C. § 691(a)(3) (1993).
139. LANE & ZARITSKY, supra note 103, 15.07[2] (citing I.R.C. §§ 691(a)(2),
691(a)(4)(B) (1992)).
140. Act of Oct. 19, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-471, § 3, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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died is taxed to the decedent's estate, and is reported on
the first fiduciary income tax return filed by the estate.
Under earlier case law, it could be argued that the gain
was effectively forgiven and eliminated through this de-
vice.
141
The 1980 Act also tightened the rules in cases where the
obligor and the obligee are related:
The current rule (Section 691(a)(5)) also provides that, in
determining the amount of any income in respect of a dece-
dent, the fair market value of the obligation cannot be less
than its face amount, if the obligor and obligee are related
parties. This ensures that the full amount of gain that the
decedent would have recognized had the decedent survived
to collect the receivable will be taxed to the estate. If the
fair market value of the receivable exceeds its face amount,
because the contract interest rate exceeds market interest
rates, it appears that the estate is also subject to tax on
the excess.'42
H. Tentative Conclusions with Respect to Comparability
After reviewing the revenue streams described in part II,
subsections (A) through (G), some general conclusions seem
justified. For estate tax purposes, the future revenue stream is
simply reduced to present value in the case of pension plan
annuities, patent and copyright royalties, coupon bonds, part-
nership receivables and payments on installment sales. The
rent on a long term lease is not per se reduced to present value
and taxed directly, but the effect is virtually the same when
the long term rents serve as the primary determinant of the
underlying property's current fair market value. Oil and gas
properties may be valued according to engineering (analytical)
appraisals which project future extractions and discount them
to present value, but the Service prefers a market based ap-
proach which relies on the recent sale of comparable properties.
141. LANE & ZARITSKY, supra note 103, S 15.0731[a] (citing I.R.C. § 691(a)(5)
(1992); Miller v. Usry, 160 F. Supp. 368 (W.D. La. 1958)).
142. Id. 15.07[3][b] (citing I.R.C. § 691(a)(5)(B) (1992)). For definitions of related
parties, see I.R.C. §§ 318(a), 453(f) (1992).
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Future interest payments on U.S. savings bonds are not a con-
sideration since these bonds are taxed on their date of death
redemption value with accrued interest included. Distributions
from S-corporations are normally made as ordinary income, and
no IRD or present value calculation is necessary.
Thus, a recurrent, although not universally applied, theme in
the examples of future revenue streams is the concept of dis-
counting the future revenues to their present value, and then
subjecting that value to the federal and state estate taxes. The
situation most directly analogous to future lottery payouts is
that of an installment sale, wherein the obligee contracts with
the obligor to receive his consideration in installments. When
the obligee or lottery winner dies before all installments are
collected, the remaining installments are reduced to present
value and the estate tax is computed.
The one constant present in all these examples which is not
present in the case of future lottery payouts, is the liquidity or
marketability of the underlying asset. If estate taxes in any of
these seven examples exceed the ability of the estate to pay
from other assets, the asset giving rise to the tax liability may
itself be sold or assigned in order to raise the cash to pay the
estate tax. This is, at least under current Virginia law, not true
for future lottery payouts flowing to a decedent's estate.'43
Given the general consistency of the federal estate tax statutes
and regulatory interpretations which reduce future revenue
streams to their present value, it appears that the Service is
justified in prescribing this treatment for future lottery payouts.
But given that marketability of the underlying asset is seem-
ingly assumed by the Service, the fact that lottery payouts lack
this quality indicates that some concession on the part of the
Service is in order. This concession probably should come in the
form of relaxation of the rigid application of the annuity tables
prescribed in the Regulations.' The possibility of revisiting
the issue of valuation, alluded to at the end of part I(F) is the
most equitable avenue for addressing the dilemma of the
143. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-4013. (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1993). The
beneficiaries of a deceased lottery winner do have the option of disclaiming the be-
quest, thereby avoiding the liquidity and tax problems altogether. For the initially eu-
phoric beneficiaries, this will be of little consolation.
144. See supra notes 4, 24 and accompanying text.
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deceased lottery winner. Such an approach would preserve the
integrity and consistency of the IRD and present value
concepts, while still acknowledging the inherent unfairness of
applying the estate tax to an asset which cannot be liquidated
to pay the tax. We will return to a discussion of valuation in
part V.
III. STATE DEATH AND INCOME TAx IMPLICATIONS
In Part I(D), we addressed the impact of state death (estate)
taxes on the overall tax problem. We noted that the Virginia
Estate Tax Act is keyed to the federal tax Code, with the Vir-
ginia estate tax imposed in (and thus capped at) "the amount of
the federal credit .*.."" or, for the Virginia estates of nonres-
idents, a fraction of the federal credit.146
Residents of other states, or Virginia residents holding prop-
erty in other states, should be aware that other state codes
may not be similarly synchronized with the federal Code. If
those state codes impose a state death tax exceeding the federal
credit specified in I.R.C. § 2011(b), the excess will not be offset
by the federal credit and the combined federal/state estate tax
will be higher than the federal tax alone. The scenarios
depicted in Tables 1 and 2 in part I(D) would be impacted
accordingly.
State income tax statutes must also be considered. Those
state codes which "piggyback" on the federal Code may offer
some relief in the form of a deduction for the federal estate tax
paid.
This (federal) deduction may be applied ratably over the
years when the lottery payouts (IRD) are actually received " 7
when computing the estate's or the beneficiary's federal income
tax. Virginia taxpayers' taxable income is their "federal adjust-
ed gross income for the taxable year ... with the modifications
specified ... ."148 In computing their state taxable income,
145. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-902(A) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
146. Id. § 58.1-903(A).
147. See I.R.C. § 691(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1993); see also supra note 41 and accompanying
text.
148. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-322(A) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
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Virginia taxpayers are entitled to deduct.from their federal AGI
"[tihe amount allowable for itemized deductions for federal
income tax purposes where the taxpayer has elected for the
taxable year to itemize deductions on his federal re-
turn ...."" Thus, the deduction for federal estate taxes paid
does double duty-first as a deduction in computing federal
income taxes, and then as a deduction in computing Virginia
income taxes. It should be noted that the deductions are for
federal estate taxes paid. To the extent that federal estate taxes
otherwise due are reduced by the federal credit for state death
taxes paid, the deduction for federal income tax purposes is the
net federal estate tax paid after subtracting the amount of the
credit for state death taxes. Because the Virginia income tax
deductions "piggyback" on the federal income tax deductions,
the Virginia estate tax paid is similarly not available as a de-
duction when computing the Virginia income tax.
The income tax statutes in other states may not parallel
those of Virginia in this respect, and they should be studied
carefully to determine their full impact.
IV. SOLUTIONS AT THE CONGRESSIONAL LEVEL
As noted in part I(C), upon a showing of "undue hardship,"
the IRS may grant the lottery winner's beneficiaries up to ten
years to pay, without penalty, but with interest, the federal
estate tax due.50 Likewise, as noted in part II(F), if certain
qualifications are met, the estate tax due on a decedent's inter-
est in a small business may be paid over a period of fourteen
years.'5' Thus, precedent has been set by statute to grant ex-
tended periods to pay the federal estate tax in cases of hard-
ship.'52 Since the lottery payments at issue are, by (Virginia)
state statute, payable only over a period of twenty years, it
seems consistent with the Service's policy to enact a statutory
provision allowing payment of estate taxes over the same period
in which the lottery payouts giving rise to the taxes are
149. Id. § 58.1-322(D)(1)(a).
150. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
152. This policy is specifically reinforced by Treas. Reg. § 20.6161-1(a) (1992), ex-
ample (2). See supra note 21.
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received. The present value of the future revenue stream could
be computed prior to closing the estate. Then the overall estate
tax could be calculated and the tax liability not ascribable to
lottery winnings could be paid out of the assets of the estate.
The portion of the tax liability ascribable to lottery winnings
could then be assigned to the individual beneficiaries to be paid
over the "life" of the lottery receipts.
Such a provision would do nothing to undermine the IRD or
present value concepts embedded in numerous sections of the
Code. Further, the fact that interest would be assessed on the
unpaid balances would assure the Service that the revenues
due and payable would not be eroded by inflation.
V. SOLUTIONS AT THE IRS LEVEL
In parts I(E) and II(H), we discussed the fact that a common
characteristic of the other streams of future revenue is their
liquidity or marketability. If necessary, they may be liquidated
in order to raise the cash to pay the estate tax due. We noted
that under Virginia law, this option is not available to the
estates or beneficiaries of lottery winners since the winnings
are not transferable. In part I(C), we discussed the principle of
discounting the value which would otherwise attach for estate
tax purposes to reflect this diminished marketability, and in
parts I(F) and II(H) we promised to return to the "ultimate"
issue of valuation. As noted in part I(C), the present value of
future lottery payouts is certainly greater than zero, but be-
cause the income rights are not alienable, they do not have the
value that would be derived from standard government annuity
tables. We must now direct our attention to the task of deter-
mining this value.
The Code is virtually silent with respect to the question of
valuation. The two estate tax sections of general application,
sections 2031 and 2033, use circular language such as "[the
value of the gross estate ... shall be determined by ... the
value at the time of ... death of all property ... 2153 and
"[t]he value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
153. I.R.C. § 2031(a) (1993).
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property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at
the time of his death." 15 4 The Code thus provides no real guid-
ance in assigning a dollar amount to the value of lottery
payouts. "On difficult questions of valuation, one must ordinari-
ly turn from the Code to the estate and gift tax regulations,
and then to the vast, uncoordinated, and sometimes inconsis-
tent body of case law and administrative rulings."'55
The one refrain which echoes throughout the Regulations is
that of fair market value, and unlike the Code, the Regulations
do supply a definition:
The fair market value is the price at which the property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell
and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.
The fair market value of a particular item of property
includible in the decedent's gross estate is not to be deter-
mined by a forced sale price."'
This willing buyer-willing seller definition of value has been
applied by the courts in hundreds of tax cases."' The U.S.
Supreme Court has approvingly noted it to be "nearly as old as
the federal income, estate, and gift taxes themselves."
58
It is, perhaps, useful to make a distinction between "fair"
value, which connotes normal or inherent value, on the one
hand, and "fair market" value, on the other. The meaning of
the latter disregards any intrinsic value and simply ascribes
value according to the price dictated by the free and open work-
ing of the market:
Two conceptions of value are possible. First it is apparent
that an asset always has some theoretical, underlying value
which is revealed or made apparent by subsequent events.
154. Id. § 2033 (1993).
155. 5 BITrKER, supra note 55, 135.1.1.
156. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965) (estate tax). For substantially similar lan-
guage, see § 25.2512-1 (1992) (gift tax) and § 1.170A-1(c)(2) (1990) (income tax).
157. See 5 BIrTKER, supra note 55, % 135.1.2 n.22 (citing Emanuel L. Gordon,
What Is Fair Market Value?, 8 TAx L. REV. 35 (1952) (definition applied in over 500
tax cases as of 1952)).
158. 5 BITrKER, supra note 55, 135.1.2 (quoting United States v. Cartwright, 411
U.S. 546, 551 (1973)).
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For example, an unsigned painting by Botticelli languishing
in a second hand art shop with a minimal price tag always
had the same inherent value which it acquires when the
creator of the painting is later discovered. In a second
sense, however, value is a practical process, always chang-
ing in accord with the price that it will yield on the market
at a given time. In this sense, the undiscovered Botticelli
has a value far less than its "inherent" value. The Code and
the Regulations clearly enshrine this second sense of
value."9
The twin concepts of fair market value and discounting to
reflect illiquidity are both intuitive and mutually reinforcing. If
a block of stock is so large that it cannot be sold without de-
pressing all the shares of that stock, a discount for the special
underwriter sale required would be necessary both to "move"
the stock and to reflect the price that the seller would actually
realize. If the shares of a small, family-held business are not
traded on an exchange, they would have no nominal fair mar-
ket value, and a discount from book value might be required to
generate the investor interest that is required to set a market
value and, coincidentally, to move the offering. 6 ' In part
I(C),16 cases were cited reflecting discounts of thirty-five and
forty-three percent. The amount of the discount may be affected
by many factors. "In general, any factor that would reasonably
be considered in determining whether property should be pur-
chased or sold is relevant in determining fair market value for
estate tax purposes."'62 Indeed, nonmarketability discounts of
almost ninety percent have been recorded.6 3
Before addressing directly the question of valuing future
lottery payouts, a final general observation is in order. Al-
though courts like to see evidence of the "real" market in opera-
159. 5 BITTKER, supra note 55, 1 135.1.2 (quoting American Natl Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States, 594 F.2d 1141, 1144 n.2 (7th Cir. 1979) (estate tax)).
160. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 18.
162. STEPHENS, supra note 116, % 4.02[2] (citing Estate of Smith v. Commissioner,
57 T.C. 650, 658 n.7 (1972), affd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, Lowe v. Commissioner, 423 U.S. 827 (1975)).
163. See George S. Arneson, Nonmarketability Discounts Should Exceed Fifty Per-
cent, 59 TAXES 25, 25 (1981)(citing Robert E. Moroney, Most Courts Overvalue Closely
Held Stock, 51 TAXES 144, 144-56 (1973)).
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tion, as evidenced by sales of comparable property, the litera-
ture contains numerous references to theoretical transactions
involving hypothetical willing buyers and sellers." It is to
such a transaction that we now turn.
We saw in Table 2 in part I(D) that the net lottery proceeds
over the twenty year period 1992-2011 aggregated to
$7,984,541. We also saw, without a great deal of discussion,
that the future value of these net proceeds, assuming reinvest-
ment of the net proceeds at an after-tax return of six percent,
would result in a twenty year after-tax, after-expenses accumu-
lation of $11,652,620. In other words, if our hypothetical benefi-
ciaries exercised the ultimate in fiscal restraint, spending none
of the proceeds and reinvesting every dollar that remained after
taxes and interest had been paid, after twenty years, they
would have approximately $11,650,000 in the bank. On the
other hand, if our hypothetical beneficiaries lacked fiscal re-
straint, they might want to seek out an investor to buy their
portfolio-cum-problems, and then, as the saying goes, take the
money and run. Of course, in Virginia, this is statutorily forbid-
den. Such alienation is proscribed by section 58.1-4013 of the
Code of Virginia.
However, since this is a theoretical example, with hypotheti-
cal actors, we may pursue the inquiry to its conclusion. The
conclusion of the valuation inquiry is that the fair market value
of the beneficiaries' lottery portfolio is the price that a dispas-
sionate, fully advised investor would pay to buy the portfolio
with all its problems, but promising $11,652,620 in twenty years."
164. See, e.g., STEPHENS, supra note 116, 4.02[2]; 5 BrrKER, supra note 55,
135.1.2. Bittker writes:
In addition to being willing and reasonably well-informed, the parties to
the imaginary sale are ordinarily envisioned as disembodied actors-free
from the passions and other personal characteristics of the owner of the
property being valued and, if the most likely buyer can be identified,
unaffected by the latter's special characteristics.
Id.
165. There is quite respectable authority for this proposition. The Second Circuit,
in reversing and remanding a Tax Court income tax decision, wrestled with the ques-
tion of the proper valuation of a group of debtors' "securities" (scrip) used to pay
interest on bonds which they had issued. Reasoning that the scrip had value to the
extent that a market existed for it and the creditors could exchange it for cash, the
court answered the valuation question with the simple formulation of "what-you-could-
have-got-for-it-in-money-if-you-had-sold-it." Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314,
48719941
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
When inspecting the remainder interest columns of the gov-
ernment present worth actuarial tables for a period of twenty
years at six percent (the terms used in Table 2),166 one sees
the figure of .311805. Multiplying this figure by the twenty
year remainder interest of $11,652,620 yields a present value of
$3,633,345. If the hypothetical investor insisted on a hedge
against inflation and projected a quite modest three percent
annual inflation rate over the twenty years, the factor for nine
percent would be .178431167 and the resultant present value
would be $2,079,189. Since the various factors used in Table 2
do not take inflation into account, a consistent (and conserva-
tive) approach would be to assign a present value with no infla-
tionary hedge, or $3,633,345. This is the sum required to
"move" the portfolio-the amount an investor would be willing
to pay now to acquire an illiquid instrument, whose "only" at-
traction is an after-tax growth to $11,652,620 twenty years
hence.
There is, to be sure, a certain circular quality to these com-
putations. If the present value of the lottery portfolio is
$3,633,345 to the investor and thus establishes the fair market
value, the IRS will be obliged to assess the estate tax based on
this figure rather than the earlier (Table 1) values of
$11,013,737 (initial calculation) or $9,301,099 (final calculation).
The figures for federal estate tax, state death tax (an offset in
our example), and interest would all be smaller, and the resul-
tant net proceeds and the twenty year future value of these net
proceeds would be higher than in the Table 2 computations.
This in turn, would yield a present value of the portfolio higher
than $3,633,345, which in turn would lead to higher estate tax-
es, and so on. It is beyond the scope of this article to develop
an algorithm which would "zero in" on the present value of the
portfolio. What does seem plain in light of the willing buyer-
willing seller concept is that a present value far lower than
$11,013,737 or $9,301,099 is appropriate as a true represen-
tation of fair market value. The Andrews court would doubtless
agree.
317 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 748 (1943).
166. See I.R.S. Pub. 1457, 3-10, Table B (Aug., 1989).
167. Id. at 3-18.
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There is one final observation to be made before leaving the
subject of valuation and that is the propriety of imputing an
after-tax present value to the portfolio. Compensating for the
effect of taxes is well established in the case law:
In determining what they will pay for property, buyers
usually take into account the taxes that will be incurred in
operating the property. For example, in estimating the fu-
ture net earnings of an apartment building, bidders must
give the same attention to anticipated local real property
taxes as to wage and utility costs.
In valuing the stock of a corporation, it is customary to
take into account not only excise and other taxes incurred
in operating its business, but also the corporation's income
taxes because the shareholders' return on investment con-
sists of the after-tax earnings. Courts have taken into ac-
count special taxes to which the corporation is subject (e.g.
the personal holding company tax), as well as tax bene-
fits.
168
Professor Bittker goes on to note that "[flair market value is
the amount the hypothetical buyer must pay to get the proper-
ty, not the net amount the hypothetical seller receives after all
expenses and taxes."' Finally, this concept applies with
equal force to estate or gift taxes.70
Thus, the solution at the IRS level would be for the Service
to acknowledge the willing buyer-willing seller determinant of
price that underlies the true fair market value of the lottery
"portfolio." A new Regulation addressing the problem of totally
illiquid income rights and incorporating the present worth prin-
ciples described in this section (as opposed to the "standard"
calculations of Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-7)'would be nec-
essary. As previously mentioned, a definitive and precise valua-
168. 5 BrTKER, supra note 55, % 135.3.8 (citing Ambassador Apartments, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C. 236, 243 (1968), affd per curiam, 406 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1969)
(income tax)(payroll taxes deducted in estimating net income); Obermer v. United
States, 238 F. Supp. 29, 34 (D. Haw. 1964) (value of family corporation adversely
affected by status as personal holding company)); Gottlieb v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M.
(CCH) 765 (1974) (income tax)(operating expenses include real estate, water, and
sewer taxes).
169. 5 BITTKER, supra note 55, I 135.3.8 (citations omitted).
170. See 5 BrITKER, supra note 55, I 135.3.8 n.75 (citing Guest v. Commissioner,
77 T.C. 9, 29 (1981) (estate tax) (transfer taxes depress value)).
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tion would require the development of an algorithm which could
deal with the myriad of shifting variables involved.
VI. SOLUTIONS AT THE STATE LEVEL
A. "Solutions" Such as Code of Virginia § 58.1-4013 Probably
not Effective
Section 58.1-4013 of the Code of Virginia (State Lottery Law)
was rewritten by the 1992 General Assembly. Subsection A
directs that lottery winnings are not assignable except to a
deceased prize winner's designated beneficiary or estate or
pursuant to a judicial order. The statute goes on to specify that
"[playments made according to the terms of a deceased prize
winner's beneficiary designation ... are effective by reason of
the contract involved and this statute and are not to be consid-
ered as testamentary ... ."' Subsection B reads:
Investments of prize proceeds made by the Department to
fund the payment of an annuitized prize are to be held in
the name of the Department or the Commonwealth and not
in the name of the prize winner. Any claim of a prize win-
ner to a future payment remains inchoate until the date the
payment is due under Department regulations. 2
According to Kenneth W. Thorson, Director of the Virginia
Lottery, the 1992 rewrite represented an attempt to assist the
potential beneficiaries of lottery winners in prospective disputes
with the IRS. The motivation was to enable the Commonwealth
to retain quasi-title to the income rights until each annual
payment ripened into ownership by the winner or his successor
in interest. Having only "inchoate" rights but lacking true "own-
ership" of the future income stream, so the thinking went, the
individual beneficiaries would not be subject to the estate tax
on the future payments.
17
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-4013(A) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1993).
172. Id. § 58.1-4013(B).
173. Interview with Kenneth W. Thorson, Director of the Virginia Lottery, in Rich-
mond, Va. (July 28, 1993).
490 [Vol. 28:443
LOTTERY WINNINGS OF A DECEDENT
As appealing as this line of reasoning is to winners and their
potential beneficiaries, it is highly unlikely that it would with-
stand a challenge brought by the Service. When a player wins
and subsequently accepts a lottery jackpot, his contract with
the Commonwealth (through its subsidiary, the State Lottery
Department) is perfected; he acquires legal ownership of the
income rights which comprise the jackpot. These rights to a
stream of future income constitute IRD, as we concluded in
part 1I(H). By statute, he cannot assign these income rights
inter vivos, but he can make testamentary disposition of them.
Should the winner die before collecting all the payments, his
will, the designated beneficiary form, or the Virginia intestacy
statute will direct the disposition of the uncollected payments.
Legal ownership of the remaining amounts then vests in the
winner's successor(s) in interest. An ownership interest has
passed from a decedent to his successor(s). That interest (IRD)
is subject to the federal estate tax and, as the payments are
received, to the federal income tax.
There is a line of cases which the Service would undoubtedly
cite as support for the application of the federal tax laws when
there is a conflict with state laws that seek to define property
interests. The earliest of these cases was Allen v. Henggeler."
In this appeal of an estate tax decision, the Eighth Circuit
held:
The case was argued on the assumption that there is a
conflict between the state and federal decisions. There is no
room for conflict in this case. Each jurisdiction has its own
field, and in that field it is supreme. That the state stat-
utes and decisions are binding on the federal courts, as to
the interest which the wife and husband have in this prop-
erty, is not open to dispute .... In every case, the state
statutes and state decisions are looked to for the purpose of
determining the quantity and quality of the decedent's in-
terest in property left by him.
But, when that quantity and quality is found, then the
federal courts must determine whether such interest is tax-
able under the federal estate tax law. It would indeed be
unthinkable to hold that, under this federal taxing law, an
174. 32 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, Henggeler v. Allen, 280 U.S. 594
(1929).
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identical interest of the decedent (as determined by the
state courts) should be taxed in Kansas and not in Nebras-
ka, because the courts in the two states differently construe
their own state inheritance tax laws.175
The operative word in this excerpt, for our purposes, is
"whether." The state jurisdiction defines the property rights at
issue; the federal courts determine "whether such interest is
taxable .... " Section 58.1-4013 of the Code of Virginia does
attempt to define the property rights of the beneficiaries, but
the federal courts would adjudicate "whether" those rights could
be reached by the federal estate tax.
Henggeler was followed in 1930 by an income tax case, Lucas
v. Earl,'76 in which Justice Holmes wrote that "[t]here is no
doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned
them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipa-
tory arrangements and contracts however skilfully [sic] de-
vised ..... 7"' Was Justice Holmes anticipating the "anticipa-
tory arrangements" of section 58.1-4013?
In 1938, the Supreme Court decided another estate tax case,
Lyeth v. Hoey.75 Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals applied the
Massachusetts rule, holding that whether the property was
received by way of inheritance depended "upon the law of
the jurisdiction under which this taxpayer received it." We
think that this ruling was erroneous. The question as to the
construction of the exemption in the federal statute is not
determined by local law .... [W]hen the contestant is an
heir... and there is a distribution to the heir from the
decedent's estate accordingly, the question whether what
the heir has thus received has been "acquired by inheri-
tance" within the meaning of the federal statute necessarily
is a federal question. It is not determined by local character-
ization.
175. Id. at 70-71 (first emphasis added).
176. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
177. Id. at 114-15; accord Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, 142 (1932); Blair v.
Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 11 (1937).
178. 305 U.S. 188 (1938), overturned on other grounds, Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
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In dealing with the meaning and application of an act of
Congress enacted in the exercise of its plenary power under
the Constitution to tax income and to grant exemptions
from that tax, it is the will of Congress which controls, and
the expression of its will, in the absence of language evi-
dencing a different purpose, should be interpreted "so as to
give a uniform application to a nationwide scheme of taxa-
tion." Congress establishes its own criteria and the state
law may control only when the federal taxing act by ex-
press language or necessary implication makes its operation
dependent upon state law.'79
Finally, in 1940, the Supreme Court, in yet another estate
tax case, Morgan v. Commissioner,8 ' ruled:
State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal
revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created,
shall be taxed. Our duty is to ascertain the meaning of the
words used to specify the thing taxed. If it is found in a
given case that an interest or right created by local law
was the object intended to be taxed, the federal law must
prevail no matter what name is given' to the interest or
right by state law. 8'
Without further belaboring the point, it seems clear that the
precedent established in these cases bodes ill for the beneficia-
ry-taxpayer who bases his defense on section 58.1-4013.
179. Id. at 193-94 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
180. 309 U.S. 78 (1940).
181. Id. at 80-81 (citations omitted). In reading the Court's language referring to
its duty "to ascertain the meaning of the words7 and "no matter what name is giv-
en," one is reminded of a Second Circuit decision cited elsewhere in this article:
Words are invaluable instruments. But they are merely perfected
pointers, substitutes for the index finger. If you point a word or finger at
nothing, your pointing will not convert the nothing into something; talk-
ing of an eight-legged monkey with scales and fins will not bring such a
quaint creature into existence; and if an object which you name is ex-
istent but vague, its vagueness will not vanish under the spell of the
name no matter how precise.
Andrews, 135 F.2d at 317. (citations omitted).
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B. A Change in the State Lottery Department Regulations to
Permit Discounted Payouts to Executors and Administrators
(and to Individual Beneficiaries)
The Virginia State Lottery Law is silent with respect to pay-
ment of lottery prizes over time as opposed to a lump sum. The
State Lottery Department Regulations provide the following:
When prize payable over time.
Unless the rules for any specific on-line game provide
otherwise, any cash prize of $100,001 or more will be paid
in multiple payments over tinfte. The schedule of payments
shall be designed to pay the winner equal dollar amounts in
each year, with the exception of the first, until the total
payments equal -the prize amount.'82
This regulation is supplemented by the Virginia Lottery
Director's Order 32(90):
"Minimum Jackpot" means the minimum jackpot prize
amount for matching all 6 of the 6 numbers drawn. Until
changed, the minimum jackpot will be $1,000,000 paid over
20 years. The jackpot prize amount will be divided among
the number of winning plays. The smallest annual pre-tax
payment will be no less than $5,001. If there are multiple
winners and their share falls below the annuitized cut-off
level, the prize will be paid in a lump sum. The lump sum
payment will be the current discounted value of the prize
paid in equal installments over 20 years."
These excerpts from departmental regulations and Director's
Orders, together with the Code's silence on the subject, imply a
delegation of authority by the General Assembly to the Lottery
Director to promulgate the necessary rules in this area of the
State Lottery's operations. It would seem to be a simple enough
matter to authorize a discounted-to-present-value, lump sum
payout to the personal representative of the decedent in those
cases where the winner died before collecting the full amount of
the prize.
182. Virginia State Lottery Dept. Reg. VR 447-02-2, § 3.33 (1992).
183. Virginia Lottery Director's Order 32(90), 14 (Oct. 31, 1990).
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However, according to Kenneth Thorson, there are some prob-
lems and risks associated with this solution.'" If the payout
were made in a lump sum, not only would the estate tax be
due on the full amount, but income tax would apply to the
lump sum on the estate's income tax return, resulting in the
exposure of more of the winnings to the maximum marginal
rate than would be the case if the payments were spread over a
number of years. If there were multiple beneficiaries, some
might feel comfortable with the "management" problem of pay-
ing the taxes and refraining from dissipating the payments in
consumption. Others, however, might want to take their lump
sum share, pay the (higher) taxes, and be free to use the rest
as they see fit.
If the lump sum option is available to all beneficiaries, how-
ever, the Service might assess full taxes immediately on all
beneficiaries under the doctrine of constructive receipt. Under
this doctrine, if a taxpayer has an unqualified, vested right to
receive immediate, full payment, even though she has not actu-
ally received the money, the IRS may view the money as being
constructively received and impose taxes on the full
amount.
185
It would involve some risk to knowingly test the boundaries
of an "unqualified, vested right," since the Service's response to
any given situation is unpredictable. However, the risk could
probably be minimized by the promulgation of a regulation
whereby the individual beneficiaries each had to formally peti-
tion the Lottery Department in order to receive a lump sum
payout. If final discretion rested with the Lottery Department,
it could be persuasively argued that substantial limitations or
restrictions on the beneficiaries' access to the money existed,
thus barring the application of the constructive receipt
principle.88
184. Interview with Kenneth W. Thorson, Director of the Virginia Lottery, in Rich-
mond, Va. (July 28, 1993).
185. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979).
186. Id. See generally Adam M. Ekonomon, Constructive Receipt of Income: Baxter
v. Commissioner, 5 AKRON TAX J. 241 (1988) (discussing when a taxpayer construc-
tively receives income); Judith H. O'Dell, Income Can Be Deferred without Running
the Risk of Constructive Receipt Being Applied, 16 TAX'N FOR L. 210 (1988) (discussing
the rules governing constructive receipt of income).
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If such a regulation could be formulated, it would be the
simplest, "cleanest" solution to the entire problem. It would be
easy to promulgate, requiring only a stroke of the proverbial
administrative pen. It would enable individual beneficiaries to
petition the Lottery Department for a lump sum payout, while
those beneficiaries willing to accept the "management" problem
could elect a regulatory default option of receiving their pay-
ments over the normal twenty year period. It would avoid the
probably quixotic alternative of seeking a new Treasury Regula-
tion (with attendant algorithm). The one flaw is the lack of
assurance that any such regulation would pass the Service's
constructive receipt test. But again, a carefully drawn regula-
tion, giving final discretion to the Lottery Department, would
probably suffice. The Service might even be persuaded to "con-
sult" in drafting such a regulation.
VII. (PARTIAL) SOLUTIONS AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
A. Marital Deduction Considerations
As trite as it may sound, one of the most effective actions a
jackpot winner can take is to remain or to become married. The
marital deduction shelters all amounts passing from a decedent
to a surviving spouse, except for terminable interests.'87 Thus,
a lottery winner can ensure that he will experience no estate
tax problems by being married and having a will that directs
his lottery income rights to his surviving spouse. If a lottery
winner is not married, the fact of his winning, once publicized,
should ensure no dearth of spousal candidates. This option does
not provide universal remedies, however, as many potential
winners may already be in comfortable circumstances and may
wish to make their children the beneficiaries of the prize mon-
ey. State laws, moreover, may foreclose the option in certain
situations.'
187. See I.R.C. § 2056(a)-(b) (1993).
188. See PETER N. SWISHER ET AL., FAMILY LAW; CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
208, 218 (1990). Same sex marriages are barred by statute in virtually all states. Id.
at 208. Statutes forbidding incestuous marriages vary in the degree of consanguinity
regulated, but typically proscribe marriage to a parent, a child, or a sibling, and
often extend this proscription to nieces, nephews, etc. Id. at 218-19.
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B. Insurance on the Lottery Winner's Life
Life insurance can be a very effective estate planning tool
and is used to manage the tax problems of large estates gener-
ally. Proceeds of a life insurance policy made payable to the
decedent's beneficiaries are (with certain minor exceptions) not
subject to federal income tax.'89 By placing the policy in an ir-
revocable life insurance trust, or by otherwise divesting herself
of the "incidents of ownership"9 ' of the policy, the lottery win-
ner can ensure that the proceeds of the policy will not be sub-
ject to the estate tax.
If the lottery winner is unmarried and is determined to re-
main so, one possible solution is to secure single life coverage,
or coverage on her life only. In the discussion of Table 1 in part
I(D) we noted total death tax liability of $5,505,555. In order to
fund this potential liability (mindful that income taxes will
consume a large part of any given year's payout), the winner
might consider a single life policy of $5,500,000. Tables 3 and 4
show the costs of providing such coverage for a male, aged fifty,
and a female, aged seventy, respectively.'
The figures in Table 3 reflect the costs for a preferred non-
smoker, i.e., one with no risk factors. The annual premium,
which remains constant throughout the life of the policy, is
$78,442. The policy mix is ten percent whole life and ninety
percent term insurance. The three sets of statistics are current
values (assuming a continuing dividend equal to that earned in
July 1993), index values (dividend equal to the average of the
past fifty years), and guaranteed values (no dividend). Not
shown 'on Table 3 is the fact that current value dividends
would generate cash sufficient to "vanish" the premium after
seventeen years, i.e. the policy would sustain itself without fur-
ther premiums beyond that point. Index value dividends would
vanish the premium after the twenty-fifth year. With guaran-
teed values or no dividends, the premium would never vanish.
189. See I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (1993).
190. 'See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1979).
191. Tables provided by Lawrence W. Jarman, Jr., CLU, Vice President, TBA Asso-
dates, Richmond, Virginia (Aug. 17, 1993).
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Table 3
COMPARATIVE VALUES AT CURRENT SCALE, AT INDEX,
AND GUARANTEED VALUES PREPARED FOR
CONFIDENTIAL MALE PREFERRED NONSMOKER, AGE 50
$550000 MANULIFE FINANCIAL'S PREMIER WHOLE LIFE (1992) B84-93
INITIAL ANNUAL PREMIUM
$4950000 LIFE PLUS I RIDER
$11716.00
$66725.99
$5500000 TOTAL INITIAL INSURANCE INITIAL ANNUAL PREMIUM $78441.99
VALUES AT CURRENT AND AT INDEX INCLUDE BENEFITS ATTRIBUTABLE TO DIVIDENDS
-GUARANTEED VALUES ASSUME THAT NO DIVIDENDS ARE PAID**
**AND THAT PREMIUMS ARE PAID EVERY YEAR**
CURRENT VALUES INDEX VALUES GUARANTEED VALUES**
TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
CASH TOTAL DEATH TOTAL DEATH GUAR GUAR GUAR
PREMIUM CASH BENEFIT PREMIUM CASH BENEFIT PREMIUM CASH DEATH
YEAR AGE DUE VALUE BEG OF YR DUE VALUE BEG OF YR DUE VALUE BENEFIT
37571 5500001
77812 5500000
126085 5500000
175227 5500000
225407 5500000
276403 5500000
329836 5500000
386022 5500000
444157 5500000
504206 5500000
566580 5500000
652827 5500000
741732 5500000
831808 5500000
921804 5500000
78442 37301 5500001
78442 77061 5500000
78442 124496 5500000
78442 172384 5500001
78442 220865 5500000
392210
78442 269706 5500001
78442 320496 5500001
78442 373506 5500000
78442 427894 5500000
78442 483582 5500000
784420
78442 541011 5500000
78442 621286 5500000
78442 703143 5500000
78442 785040 5500000
78442 865701 5500000
1176630
78442 37058 5500001
78442 65112 5500000
78442 98876 5500000
78442 130478 5500000
78442 160876 5500000
392210
78442 187939 5500000
78442 212269 5500000
78442 235370 5500000
78442 256901 5500000
78442 276285 5500000
784420
78442 284118 5500000
78442 306802 5500000
78442 323140 5500000
78442 331717 5500000
78442 330940 5500000
1176630
50 78442
51 78442
52 78442
53 78442
54 78442
392210
55 78442
56 78442
57 78442
58 78442
59 78442
784420
60 78442
61 78442
62 78442
63 78442
64 78442
1176630
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Table 4
COMPARATIVE VALUES AT CURRENT SCALE, AT INDEX,
AND GUARANTEED VALUES PREPARED FOR
CONFIDENTIAL
499
FEMALE STANDARD NONSMOKER, AGE 70
$550000 MANULIFE FINANCIAL'S PREMIER WHOLE LIFE (1992) B84-93
INITIAL ANNUAL PREMIUM $28337.00
$4950000 LIFE PLUS I RIDER $207900.00
$5500000 TOTAL INITIAL INSURANCE INITIAL ANNUAL PREMIUM $236237.00
VALUES AT CURRENT AND AT INDEX INCLUDE BENEFITS ATTRIBUTABLE TO DIVIDENDS
-GUARANTEED VALUES ASSUME THAT NO DIVIDENDS ARE PAID**
"AND THAT PREMIUMS ARE PAID EVERY YEAR"
CURRENT VALUES INDEX VALUES GUARANTEED VALUES**
TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
CASH TOTAL DEATH TOTAL DEATH GUAR GUAR GUAR
PREMIUM CASH BENEFIT PREMIUM CASH BENEFIT PREMIUM CASH DEATH
DUE VALUEBEG OF YR DUE VALUEBEG OF YR DUE VALUEBENEFIT
236237
236237
236237
236237
236237
1181185
236237
236237
236237
236237
236237
2362370
236237
236237
2834844
114545
236980
367317
492564
617385
739519
866544
997414
1131954
1266976
1404974
1657614
1705897
1770551
1841354
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
236237
236237
236237
236237
236237
1181185
236237
236237
236237
236237
236237
2362370
236237
236237
236237
236237
236237
3543555
113720
234750
362675
484429
604650
720849
840569
962645
1086903
1209948
1334591
1563464
1828329
2119214
2435245
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
236237
236237
236237
236237
236237
1181185
236237
236237
236237
236237
236237
2362370
236237
236237
236237
236237
236237
3543555
112815
187774
265652
331377
387295
424487
445079
451822
429917
385656
246601
210238
229339
247935
266008
5500000
5500000
5500001
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500001
5500000
5500000
5500001
5500000
4319614
3200032
2906323
2648574
Table 4, as mentioned, shows the data for a seventy year old
female. The figures reflect the costs for a "standard" nonsmok-
er, i.e., one with some risk factors. The policy mix is the same,
ten percent whole life and ninety percent term. As might be
expected, the annual premium is significantly higher, $236,237
for the life of the policy. Here, the current value dividend van-
ishes the premium after the twelfth year and the index value
dividend does so after the fifteenth year. Although an annual
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1 70
2 71
3 72
4 73
5 74
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insurance premium of almost a quarter million dollars seems
high, a seventy year old must weigh this cost against the sta-
tistical probability of dying before collecting the full lottery
jackpot and thereby leaving a large tax problem for her benefi-
ciaries.
C. Survivorship Insurance
If the lottery winner is married and intends to leave the
income rights to her surviving spouse, there will be no estate
tax at the first death. There will be an estate tax problem at
the death of the surviving spouse, however, and this problem
can be addressed with survivorship, or second-to-die, insurance.
Tables 5 and 6 show the details of such coverage, again with
$5,500,000 policies and the same ten percent-ninety percent
mix.
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Table 5
COMPARATIVE VALUES AT CURRENT SCALE, AT INDEX,
AND GUARANTEED VALUES PREPARED FOR
R.il CONFIDENTIAL MRS. CONFIDENTIAL
MALE PREFERRED NONSMOKER, AGE 50 FEMALE PREFERRED NONSMOKER, AGE 50
$550000 MANULIFE FINANCIAL'S SURVIVORSHIP SE B84-93
INITIAL ANNUAL PREMIUM $5875.00
$4950000 LIFE PLUS I RIDER $31927.50
$5500000 TOTAL INITIAL INSURANCE INITIAL ANNUAL PREMIUM $37802.50
VALUES AT CURRENT AND AT INDEX INCLUDE BENEFITS ATTRIBUTABLE TO DIVIDENDS
ESTATE PRESERVATION BENEFIT OF $4,500,000- IS INCLUDED IN THE FIRST 4 YEARS
"GUARANTEED VALUES ASSUME THAT NO DIVIDENDS ARE PAID**
**AND THAT PREMIUMS ARE PAID EVERY YEAR"
CURRENT VALUES INDEX VALUES GUARANTEED VALUES**
TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
CASH TOTAL DEATH CASH TOTAL DEATH GUAR GUAR GUAR
PREMIUM CASH BENEFIT PREMIUM CASH BENEFIT PREMIUM CASH DEATH
YEAR DUE VALUE BEG OF YR DUE VALUE BEG OF YR DUE VALUE BENEFIT
37803 12977 10000000
37803 26698 10000001
37803 45288 10000001
37803 65709 10000000
37803 87292 5500000
189013
37803 110242 5500000
37803 134594 5500000
37803 160518 5500000
37803 188204 5500000
37803 217832 5500000
378025
37803 249792 5500000
37803 284374 5500000
37803 323870 5500000
37803 369365 5500000
37803 421340 5500000
567038
37803 12830 10000000
37803 26243 10000000
37803 44327 9999999
37803 63993 10000001
37803 84542 5500000
189013
37803 106137 5500001
37803 128785 5500000
37803 152610 5500000
37803 177759 5500000
37803 204356 5500000
378025
37803 232733 5500000
37803 263100 5500001
37803 297836 5500000
37803 337805 5500000
37803 383368 5500000
567038
37803 12744 1000000
37803 25884 10000000
37803 43475 10000000
37803 62288 10000000
37803 81602 5500000
189013
37803 101314 5500000
37803 121325 5500000
37803 141572 5500000
37803 161961 5500000
37803 182363 5500000
378025
37803 201761 5500000
37803 220417 5500000
40690 243708 5500000
40690 268931 5500000
40690 295605 5500000
575700
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Table 6
COMPARATIVE VALUES AT CURRENT SCALE, AT INDEX,
AND GUARANTEED VALUES PREPARED FOR
MR. CONFIDENTIAL
MALE STANDARD NONSMOKER, AGE 70
MRS. CONFIDENTIAL
FEMALE STANDARD NONSMOKER, AGE 70
$550000 MANULIFE FINANCIAL'S SURVIVORSHIP SE B84-93
INITIAL ANNUAL PREMIUM
$4950000 LIFE PLUS I RIDER
$19916.52
$137907.03
$5500000 TOTAL INITIAL INSURANCE INITIAL ANNUAL PREMIUM $157823.56
VALUES AT CURRENT AND AT INDEX INCLUDE BENEFITS ATTRIBUTABLE TO DIVIDENDS
ESTATE PRESERVATION BENEFIT OF $4,500,000- IS INCLUDED IN THE FIRST 4 YEARS
-GUARANTEED VALUES ASSUME THAT NO DIVIDENDS ARE PAID"
**AND THAT PREMIUMS ARE PAID EVERY YEAR**
CURRENT VALUES INDEX VALUES GUARANTEED VALUES**
TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
CASH TOTAL DEATH CASH TOTAL DEATH GUAR GUAR GUAR
PREMIUM CASH BENEFIT PREMIUM CASH BENEFIT PREMIUM CASH DEATH
YEAR DUE VALUE BEG OF YR DUE VALUE BEG OF YR DUE VALUE BENEFIT
1 157824 57649
2 157824 126414
3 157824 209197
4 157824 293836
5 157824 379915
789118
6 157824 466698
7 157824 554043
8 157824 641153
9 157824 727514
10 157824 811504
1578235
11 * 749838
12 * 705120
13 * 694551
14 * 713638
15 * 757983
1578235
10000000
10000000
10000000
10000000
5500000
5500001
5500001
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
157824 57005
157824 124386
157824 204875
157824 286193
157824 367856
789118
157824 449051
157824 529599
157824 608623
157824 685574
157824 758731
1578235
157824 851348
157824 966491
* 955141
* 972691
* 1014851
1893882
10000000
9999999
9999999
10000000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500000
5500001
157824 55826 10000000
157824 119502 10000000
157824 192822 10000000
157824 262154 10000000
157824 326111 5500000
789118
157824 380463 5500000
157824 421175 5500001
157824 446736 5500000
157824 451084 5500000
157824 431784 5500000
1578235
157824 335942 5500001
157824 181176 5500000
167729 192247 1949195
167729 209501 1787571
167729 224582 1755740
2397070
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Table 5 depicts a survivorship policy for two persons, male
and female, both aged fifty, and both preferred nonsmokers.
The annual premium is $37,803. In order to keep the policy in
force, the surviving spouse must continue to pay the premiums
after the first death, since the insurance protection is for two
lives. If dividends are paid at current values, the premium will
vanish after the seventeenth year. If paid at the index, or fifty
year average, the premium will vanish after thirty-five years.
Table 6 portrays a survivorship policy for two persons, male
and female, both aged seventy, and both "standard" nonsmok-
ers. The annual premium, again as would be expected, is sig-
nificantly higher, $157,824. At current value dividends, the
premium vanishes after the tenth year. At index value divi-
dends, the premium vanishes after twelve years.
The premium for the survivorship policy for two fifty year
olds is forty-eight percent of the cost of the single life policy for
the fifty year old man alone. The premium for the seventy year
old couple's survivorship policy is sixty-seven percent of the cost
of a single life policy for the seventy year old woman alone.
These percentages reflect the statistical likelihood that two
persons will live longer than one, i.e., the survivor of a couple
will outlive a single person, age and health being equal. Thus,
there is an economic incentive to be married, as well as the
previously-discussed tax incentive.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The first and perhaps overriding conclusion is that the estate
of a deceased lottery winner does indeed have a tax problem.
There are two distinguishing factors which may serve to make
the problem more acute for the lottery winner's estate than for
other large estates. As noted, the income rights in the hands of
the lottery winner's beneficiaries are illiquid and, except for the
yearly payouts, are not available to pay estate taxes. The sec-
ond factor to take into account is that, while most large estates
are usually amassed over a period of many years, with ample
time for estate planning lawyers to develop appropriate strate-
gies, the estate of a deceased lottery winner may literally be an
overnight phenomenon. In such situations, the decedent's per-
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sonal representative may lack the time or knowledge to develop
a tax-minimizing and beneficiary-satisfying strategy.
Having acknowledged the existence of the problem, the next
conclusion is that the problem, far from being the insoluble one
initially portrayed by NAASPL, is susceptible to a solution.
Properly managed, the problem becomes the proverbial opportu-
nity-a $20 million jackpot can yield almost $8 million in after-
tax and after-expense proceeds, and if reinvested, can grow to
$11.65 million at the end of the twenty-year period.
In reviewing the tax treatment of other income streams left
by a decedent, it seems that the Code and the case law are
consistent in applying the IRD and present value concepts to
these streams. The Regulations, however, prescribe that "stan-
dard" actuarial tables be used to compute present value, and
only grudgingly acknowledge that some discount for illiquidity
may be appropriate. The case law, in contrast, recognizes dis-
counts in a wide array of situations, with amounts sometimes
approaching ninety percent. State death and income tax stat-
utes play a large role in developing a strategy, and the state-
by-state disparity makes it imperative to carefully research the
state codes in jurisdictions where the decedent owned property.
The range of possible solutions to the problem gives rise to a
number of recommendations. At the congressional level, a new
Code section should be enacted which explicitly recognizes the
inequity of imposing estate taxes on income rights which yield
cash only over a period of (possibly) many years. If lottery pay-
ments are receivable only over twenty years, the Code should
recognize this by permitting payment of the estate tax, with
interest, over twenty years as well.
Failing the enactment of a new Code section, the Service
should promulgate a new Regulation which takes the illiquidity
of the lottery income rights into account and permits a realistic
discount for nonmarketability. The willing buyer-willing seller
price discussed in part V, is clearly a small fraction of the pres-
ent value determined through government actuarial tables. The
resulting lower estate tax and lower interest suggest that a
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fairly sophisticated algorithm'92 would be needed to account
for back-and-forth adjustments.
At the state level, attempts to "define away" the problem will
likely be unavailing if a future litigant relies on state statutes
enacted for this purpose. Much more promising is a relatively
simple change in state lottery regulations permitting a dis-
counted, lump sum payout upon approval of a proper petition to
the State Lottery Department.
Individual winners can do much by way of self-help. The
starting point is knowledge and information. To this end, the
services of a competent estate planning attorney are indispens-
able. Individual winners can do much to ameliorate the problem
potentially facing their beneficiaries by marrying or remaining
married, so as to reap the advantages of the marital deduction.
They can purchase life insurance, either single life or survivor-
ship, which may solve the estate tax problem completely. Such
insurance is not inexpensive, but, in this situation, may be a
bargain. Not all winners will be insurable and premiums will
vary directly as a function of age. Therefore, individual factors
will likely drive the insurance decision.
In sum, the "lottery problem" has a solution-in fact a
number of possible solutions. NAASPL and the various state
lottery departments should consider the options presented in
192. The author acknowledges two areas in which future research could more pre-
cisely quantify the findings of this paper. The first is the algorithm discussed in part
V which would "zero in" on the present value of the "lottery portfolio." This problem
is analogous to the vastly more simple example of "net gifts," in which the donor
stipulates that the donee pay the gift tax. In that case, the tentative tax is computed
on the full fair market value of the gift and this tentative tax is then adjusted
downwards by dividing by 1.00 plus the tax rate. See Rev. Rul. 75-72, 1975-1 C.B.
310. Lacking such an algorithm, one possibility would be to present all the facts to
the Service and request that they compute the tax.
The second area that would benefit from research involves the fact that the
Table 2 (part I(D)) combined federal/state income tax rate of 35% has not been up-
dated to reflect the new (post 1993 budget bill) maximum federal rate of 39.6%. As
discussed earlier, the combination of the 39.6% federal rate and the maximum Virgin-
ia rate of 5.75% yields a total rate of 45.35%, more than ten percentage points higher
than in the Table 2 illustration. See supra note 40. The author expresses the hope
that NAASPL and Brown, Winick, Graves, Donnelly, Baskerville and Schoenebaum
might be able to update Table 2 to reflect this substantial increase. See supra note
23. The "management" problem would increase in difficulty, thus making the case for
reform even more compelling than portrayed in this analysis.
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this article, and, if appropriate, undertake a unified, coordinat-
ed strategy. Until solutions at this level are effected, individual
lottery winners, individual beneficiaries, and individual estate
planning practitioners should carefully consider the tax implica-
tions and possible tax strategies outlined in this article.
M. Eldridge Blanton, III
